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INTERPRETATION AS STATECRAFT: 
CHANCELLOR KENT AND THE COLLABORATIVE 
ERA OF AMERICAN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
FARAH PETERSON 
A fundamental institutional dilemma lies behind our debates over theo-
ries of statutory interpretation: what can judges do when lay legislatures, out 
of ignorance, inattention, or democratic zeal, enact statutes that threaten the 
working structure of specific areas of law or contravene deep-rooted rule of 
law principles?  During the first decades of the nineteenth century, the ques-
tion of what a judge could do to rein in a runaway legislature was particularly 
urgent because of the enormous amount of authority legislatures were given 
under the first American constitutions.  In an overreaction to colonials’ dec-
ades of experience with corrupt governors and judges who took their cues 
from their masters in London, the first state constitutions gave legislatures 
broad powers without practical limits.  In many states, the legislative 
branches actually controlled the judicial branches through appointment and 
removal authority, the ability to change tenure length, and salary dependence.  
It wasn’t long before many Americans regretted these original grants of au-
thority. 
Legislatures fell into popular disfavor after only a few years of incom-
petence and inconsistency, hated by both those who thought them too radical 
and redistributionist and those who thought them too firmly under the sway 
of the propertied few.  As Jack Rakove observed, it took only “a decade of 
experience under the state constitutions to expose . . . that the abuse of legis-
lative power was more ominous than arbitrary acts of the executive” and “that 
the true problem of rights was less to protect the ruled from their rulers than 
to defend minorities and individuals against factious popular majorities act-
ing through government.”1  Some of the problematic legislation of those early 
days seemed to have been passed in bad faith, including ex post facto laws 
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and takings of property in patent violation of state constitutions.2  But a lot 
of bad legislation was the result of simple incompetence—statutes written so 
confusingly they could not be executed, statutes that conflicted with each 
other, and statutes that added rights, duties, and causes of action in piecemeal 
fashion to preexisting laws.  As a result, as Gordon S. Wood put it, Americans 
began to have “serious second thoughts about their earlier confidence in their 
popularly-elected legislatures and were beginning to reevaluate their former 
hostility to judicial power and discretion.”3 
The result was a moment of opportunity for the judiciary.  The late 
1790s through the early 1820s saw a high point in what contemporaries called 
“equitable interpretation” of legislation—interpretation that allowed courts 
to mold statutes in conformity with common law precedent and background 
legal norms.  When the problem of irresponsible legislation became central 
to late eighteenth-century politics and constitution making, equitable inter-
pretation was the jurisprudential response.  This period of judicial collabora-
tion in the legislative process represents an important stage in early American 
legal development.  It was a moment in which influential judges like James 
Kent of New York wrote statutory interpretation opinions as equal partners 
with their legislatures, rather than inhabiting the more expected (rhetorical) 
roles judges claim for themselves today, either as legislatures’ mechanical 
agents or dutiful disciplinarians. 
Legal historians have paid little attention to statutes and statutory inter-
pretation.  The historiography is instead focused on the rise of a muscular 
judiciary willing to use the common law to shape society.  In the 1950s, 
Willard Hurst thought up the paradigm that historians have been writing with 
and against ever since—the idea that American judges began to prioritize the 
“release of [productive] energy” over tried-and-true English precedent.4  
Hurst’s thesis provides an organizing principle to explain American changes 
to property, contract, and labor law, as well as the law of corporations.  In the 
1970s, Morton Horwitz, a historian in dialogue with Hurst, took it a bit fur-
ther, arguing that American judges were not just displaying a new cultural 
orientation toward their work, case-by-case (as Hurst’s description seemed 
to suggest), but rather, that judges saw themselves as social engineers.5  Hor-
witz quoted common law cases in which precedent gave way to concerns 
about economic efficiency and social welfare in order to show that “by 1820 
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the process of common law decision making had taken on many of the qual-
ities of legislation.”6 
But in their focus on common law decision making, these historians 
have emphasized power shifting.  The basic idea is that judges muscled in on 
legislative territory.  This starts with the unexamined assumption that early 
American legislative and judicial branches had the same clearly defined roles 
as our modern institutions.  What those historians did not discuss, and what 
is more telling than developments in the common law, is not power shifting 
between the legislative and judicial branches but power sharing, which is 
what we find when we look at Chancellor Kent’s generation of judges and 
their methods of statutory interpretation.  In part because of those cultural 
shifts that led to what Hurst called the “release of energy” in common law 
jurisprudence, some nineteenth-century judges brought an aggressive new 
approach to statutory interpretation.  Indeed, the 1800s through 1820s saw 
novel political and constitutional offices that formally blended what we 
would think of as judicial and legislative responsibilities. 
That is not to say that equitable interpretation has gone unnoticed.  Legal 
scholars have rediscovered equitable interpretation and debated its implica-
tions for modern theories of interpretation.  Some members of the Legal Pro-
cess School hailed what they saw as a model for their own era, finding in 
equitable interpretation an example of how purpose-driven interpretation 
could work within the American constitutional framework.7  But as this Ar-
ticle will discuss, while there is some resonance between the approach of the 
Legal Process scholars and Kent’s generation, the practical and constitutional 
differences between the America of the early nineteenth century and the 
America of the twentieth limit the extent of those similarities. 
More recently, Bill Eskridge rediscovered the use of equitable interpre-
tation in the post-ratification decades and held it up as a challenge to the tex-
tualist doctrine of modern formalists, a group whose members also tend to 
adhere to original meaning as a guide to jurisprudence.8  John Manning took 
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up that challenge and argued that equitable interpretation was merely “a doc-
trinal artifact of an ancient English governmental structure, one that had 
blended governmental powers” and that had not “translate[d] well into a U.S. 
Constitution marked by separated powers.”9  After examining the “relatively 
few federal statutory cases . . . [in] the early volumes of case reports,” Man-
ning found it “safe to say that the equity of the statute never gained a secure 
foothold.”10  Eskridge published a rejoinder, which read a wide range of early 
American legal sources, including the ratification debates and John Mar-
shall’s jurisprudence, to embrace diverse interpretive tools, including equita-
ble interpretation and a more contextual, text-based analysis of statutes than 
that approved by modern formalist doctrine.11 
I believe that both scholars missed the point.  Busy grappling with the 
question of how early American judges reached across the divide between 
the judicial branch and the legislative, they did not stop to consider how that 
divide may have changed over the intervening two hundred years.  Insofar as 
Manning explains equitable interpretation as the product of an English sys-
tem in which “legislative and judicial functions merged” in a way that “min-
imize[d] the distinction between legislative and judicial functions,”12 I show 
that, instead of the break from this heritage he finds by examining a limited 
set of purely federal sources, the mingling of legislative and judicial functions 
continued in important state jurisdictions.  Manning’s observations that the 
federal Constitutional Convention rejected a Council of Revision, for exam-
ple,13 and that the convention decided to “vest[] ultimate judicial authority in 
an independent Supreme Court, rather than in the upper house of the legisla-
ture”14 seem less significant when one considers that legislative high courts 
and councils of revision were not uncommon at the state level.  The very 
conditions, therefore, that Manning agrees make it “fairly easy to see why 
[English] judges might also conceive of themselves as partners in making 
statute law more coherent and just” obtained at the state level in America 
during this formative period.15  Eskridge countered Manning with evidence 
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that judges frequently used equitable interpretation, but Eskridge didn’t ex-
plore the more interesting question: what was a “judge” at that time?  And 
what did Americans expect judges to do?  As I will show, the fact that an 
early nineteenth-century judge used a particular methodology provides little 
authority to the modern judge—who may occupy a very different office—to 
behave the same way. 
Furthermore, both Eskridge and Manning were looking for their evi-
dence in the wrong place.  There is, I think, very little the early federal re-
porters can teach us about the “original meaning” of judicial power.  In a 
sense, federal courts were not even “courts” for much of this time.  Their 
jurisdiction was tiny, and what jurisdiction they had was so freighted with 
non-legal pressure that their decisions provide little helpful data for under-
standing the development of statutory interpretation as a legal, rather than 
diplomatic, activity.  Under their original 1789 Act,16 federal courts could 
hear cases in admiralty and cases dealing with citizens of different states, 
penalties and forfeitures under the laws of the United States, and the small 
number of federal crimes.  They could not even hear all cases arising under 
the federal laws or Constitution.  The Judiciary Act of 180117 both increased 
the number of federal judges and expanded their jurisdiction, but outgoing 
Federalists had passed that Act primarily to pack the courts with their own 
appointees.  The federal courts were thereby thrust into party politics and 
confirmed as dangerous havens for a partisan philosophy that quickly waned 
in influence.  The Jeffersonians repealed the 1801 Act in 1802, and the fed-
eral courts’ jurisdiction shrank again.  Federal courts subsequently gained 
jurisdiction only in order to play highly unpopular and politically dangerous 
roles.  For example, they received jurisdiction under a temporary provision 
after the War of 1812 so that federal tax collectors could remove their en-
forcement actions from state courts.  They also gained jurisdiction under the 
1832 Force Bill in order to allow for suits to enforce tariffs on secessionists 
in South Carolina.  Again, they received jurisdiction under the 1850 Fugitive 
Slave Act to enforce slave owners’ property rights in the North.  In other 
words, lower federal courts’ most important roles were as outposts of a for-
eign and resented power or as sites of diplomacy for states with opposing 
interests. 
In short, if we want to know what Americans of the post-ratification era 
expected of their judiciary, we have to look at the states.  That is why, in an 
Article that professes to discuss the most influential jurists of the first decades 
of the nineteenth century, I do not cite Chief Justice John Marshall once.  This 
may seem strange if you believe, as Willard Hurst did, that “on the bench, 
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Marshall alone” exerted “individual influence” over the direction of legal 
change.18  Yet, looking at Marshall in the context of his time and not just as 
the genius of the present day, one sees that his vision for the nation had fewer 
and fewer adherents as his career went on.  Justice Story kept his legacy alive, 
but Marshall needed the Union army to confirm his legacy.19  A jurisprudence 
that requires civil war to assert itself may have little value as a guide to the 
legal culture of the Antebellum past.  And, quite simply, if one is looking for 
the history of statutory interpretation, Marshall’s Supreme Court is not where 
the main action takes place.  In his own time and for the generation that fol-
lowed, James Kent’s jurisdiction was more important to American law than 
John Marshall’s. 
This Article concerns the first three decades of the nineteenth century 
and shows state judges in power-sharing arrangements with their legislatures.  
In the statutory interpretation cases I describe, judges work to incorporate 
statutes into existing background common law norms and precedents in ways 
that show a large degree of legislative power.  Although these power-sharing 
arrangements were short-lived, the brief marriage of these two types of law-
making created a powerful tool for framing American jurisprudence.  And a 
review of how the great judges of the early nineteenth century saw their work 
shows, in turn, that the hard boundaries between branches of government, so 
central to the modern understanding of American constitutional structure, is 
a newer concept than is generally believed.  The place that these judges 
claimed for themselves represents a lost world of republican governance—a 
way that republicanism could have worked, and did work for a time, before 
anything like the modern understanding of separation of powers achieved 
dominance. 
*** 
This Article focuses on New York, which went the furthest of the states 
in blending branches of government, by establishing three institutional ways 
judges participated with legislators: first, a Council of Revision—made up of 
the judges of the New York Supreme Court, the chancellor, the governor, and 
the president of the Senate—empowered to veto legislation on policy or con-
stitutional grounds; second, the Court for the Correction of Errors—the 
state’s highest court—made up of both senators and judges; and, finally, alt-
hough this was not in its constitution, a practice of periodically commission-
ing judges to review and revise the accumulated body of legislation.  New 
                                                          
 18.  JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 17–18 
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York’s high level of interrelation between the judicial and legislative func-
tions of government was not typical of the new states and much of it ended 
with New York’s Constitutional Convention of 1821.  Short-lived and special 
as it was, however, New York’s early system of government had an important 
impact on the legal development of all of the states.  Historian Daniel 
Hulsebosch has shown that New York provided a “fount of legal ideas in the 
early Republic” and that its way of thinking about law and constitutions was 
“[i]ts most important cultural export.”20  New York’s success at exporting a 
new legal culture was in part due to its status as a commercial and cultural 
hub and the center of great political debates, including one of the most im-
portant debates on ratification.  But it was also in part because of the force of 
one particular New Yorker’s written work.  One could argue that the primary 
significance of New York’s transitory and unique early constitution was that 
it was only in its context that James Kent, the great American Institutionalist21 
and New York’s famous Chancellor, could have emerged. 
James Kent is remembered as a great judicial mind, and he was that.  
But he could also be called a great legislator.  His contributions to revising 
New York’s statutory code and his decades on New York’s courts, carefully 
steering those statutes into legally coherent channels, exerted an enormous 
influence on the law of all the states.  His work was not only some of the 
most admired but also the best publicized judicial writing in the country.  
When he was pushed out of office in 1821, Kent retired to write his Com-
mentaries, which read in parts as a continuation of his work as a reviser and 
interpreter of statutes.  Through the Commentaries, Kent’s ideas on the 
proper interrelation of areas of legislative concern with the common law, and 
on the manner in which legislatures should proceed on subjects under their 
purview, formed the basis of the education of several generations of Ameri-
can lawyers.22 
As a result, Kent did much to answer the problem of legislation—the 
central dilemma of how to ensure that a democratically elected legislature, 
which included as many laymen as lawyers (and sometimes more), wrote 
laws in conformity with the system of laws that made a republic possible.  He 
provided the direction required to guide American judges and legislators in 
                                                          
 20.  DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE 
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Little, Brown & Company 1896) [hereinafter 2 KENT]. 
 2018] INTERPRETATION AS STATECRAFT 719 
 
their quest for a government of laws, not men.  Populists decried Kent’s em-
phasis on erudition in all branches of government as classist and anti-demo-
cratic, and brought an end to his public career.  But the work Kent did while 
on the bench and in New York’s Council of Revision created the legal frame-
work within which the broadly applicable public and administrative statutes 
of the later nineteenth century could flourish. 
Kent was one of America’s great judges, but his record shows such a 
diversity of offices and duties that it poses a challenge to the conventional 
understanding of what it means to be a judge.  In this sense, Kent is repre-
sentative of a small category, with perhaps a dozen members, of important 
early nineteenth-century jurists.  Like George Wythe and Edmund Pendleton, 
Judges of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, Kent collected and revised 
the statute law of his state23 and then, as a judge, interpreted and applied those 
statutes.  Just as Wythe did, Kent became a law professor while a judge, 
teaching and summarizing the law for new practitioners and, perhaps as a 
result, he showed a special concern for professional standards and often chal-
lenged and encouraged practitioners from the bench in a spirit of mentor-
ship.24  Like Nathaniel Chipman, Chief Judge of Vermont’s Supreme Court, 
Kent served as a member of the Council of Revision of his state (in Vermont, 
the Council of Censors), a position that allowed him to review statutes for 
constitutionality before they became law.25  Like Jeremiah Smith, Chief Jus-
tice of New Hampshire’s Supreme Court, James Kent initiated the first pub-
lication and dissemination of judicial opinions in his state.26  And like Zeph-
aniah Swift, Chief Judge of Connecticut’s Supreme Court, and Henry 
William De Saussure, Chancellor in South Carolina, James Kent published a 
commentary on the law of his state, which helped to systematize the law 
while also justifying Jeffersonian critics in their accusations that judges 
wanted the permanence and supremacy of a code for judge-made law.27  
These judges each had an outsized influence on the development and profes-
sionalization of the law of their states, garnering not only the accolades of 
                                                          
 23.  Thomas Jefferson explains this revision, and both Wythe’s and Pendleton’s parts in it, in 1 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42–44 (Washington, D.C., Taylor & 
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BIOGRAPHY OF GEORGE WYTHE 220 (1981). 
 25.  DANIEL CHIPMAN, THE LIFE OF HON. NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, LL.D. 153–55 (Boston, 
Charles C. Little & James Brown 1846). 
 26.  JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW 
HAMPSHIRE 160–61 (2004) (recounting Smith’s efforts to achieve publication of judicial opinions 
in New Hampshire). 
 27.  1 HENRY WILLIAM DESAUSSURE, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE 
COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF SOUTH-CAROLINA, FROM THE REVOLUTION TO 
DECEMBER, 1813, INCLUSIVE (Columbia, Cline & Hines 1817); 1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM 
OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (Windham, John Byrne1795). 
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their contemporaries and immediate successors but also a place in American 
intellectual history.  These are the judges that Karl Llewellyn spoke of when 
he celebrated what he called the “Grand Style” of early American opinion 
writing,28 and their names are continually included in historians’ lists of the 
“great judges” of early American law—including, among others, Roscoe 
Pound’s list,29 Lawrence Friedman’s,30 and John Phillip Reid’s.31 
I have not chosen to focus on Kent because he was perfectly representa-
tive of this group.  He is not.  While he shared with this cadre a sense that he 
stood as a guardian of the legislature and while each jurist took a broad view 
of his responsibilities to the people and the institutions of his state, in both of 
these characteristics, Kent was at an extreme.  He was also privileged in that 
he worked in a jurisdiction where his efforts to professionalize the law were 
not politically contentious and under a constitution that allowed him to hold 
offices, at times simultaneously, granting him broad powers of mixed judicial 
and legislative character.  I nevertheless focus on Kent because, as the most 
respected and the most productive of this first generation of eminent Ameri-
can judges, he became a Napoleonic figure in American law.  He influenced 
the development of American jurisprudence in the generations that followed, 
not just in his own state but nation-wide.  It was in large part because of his 
Commentaries and because of his opinions in New York’s Johnson’s Reports 
that this period, during which judges viewed themselves as collaborators with 
legislatures, had a lasting impact on American law. 
I.  STATUTES AND LAW IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
In the years Kent served as Justice, Chief Justice, and then Chancellor 
of New York, many lawyers and judges felt that legislatures met only to cre-
ate exceptions to rules and distribute favors to individuals.  A glance at leg-
islative session minutes shows why.  Most statutes in the early republic were 
private bills rather than broadly applicable rules.  When a town needed a new 
road or a debtor needed more time to pay his creditors, or even when the 
sheriff of a county needed more time to collect taxes, the legislatures would 
act on the individual case.  Broad statutes setting forth standards—for divorce 
or fixing the circumstances under which a lottery could be held to raise 
money—did not yet dominate the business of legislation.32 
                                                          
 28. Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 396. 
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 32.  Even when legislatures did pass generally applicable statutes, they were often redundant 
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Today, a case turning on the interpretation of a statute is mainly con-
cerned with discerning what the legislature intended.  Not so in Kent’s day.  
The prevalence of private bills created a certain wariness toward legisla-
tures—a sense among professionals that legislative work should always be 
regarded with suspicion.  “‘[Statutes] are of a political rather than a civil na-
ture,’” wrote Chief Justice Jeremiah Smith of New Hampshire.  He contin-
ued, 
 Of those which prescribe rules of civil conduct to the citizens, 
rules for making and expounding contracts, principles of decision 
on the questions daily agitated in our courts of justice, the number 
is small; indeed, it may be a question, whether our system of juris-
prudence would suffer an injury by their total repeal.33 
 As another lawyer explained in 1809: 
 The common law, legislates by principles; the statute law, in de-
tail.  The former covers a multitude of cases, under a general rule, 
well digested; and explained, applied and universally known by a 
long practice.  The latter, by attempting to provide for every par-
ticular case, and excluding every thing not expressly provided for, 
necessarily omits many cases, and would leave them destitute of 
any rule of decision, if the Judges had not the common law to fly 
to, to repair and supply the imperfect work of special legislation.34 
One finds this theme again and again in the words of early judges and 
lawyers: what legislatures of the time did was “not law.”  Court decisions, 
which rested on principles rather than exceptions, were “law.”  This, then, 
was the prevailing view among members of the elite bar and bench: legisla-
tures were not in the practice of creating law, and they were not good at it. 
This conviction clearly animated the period’s most famous work of ad-
vocacy, Daniel Webster’s argument in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward.35  The controversy arose when New Hampshire tried to modify 
the terms of the Dartmouth College charter.36  Webster argued that “the law 
of the land” did not permit a legislature to change the terms of a contract by 
fiat, and he explained: 
                                                          
No man acquainted with the common law . . . can look into our statute-book, and not see 
that the framers of the statutes, in many cases, were ignorant that the common law con-
tained precisely the same provision; and in many cases, a provision different and better 
adapted to the wants of society. 
Id. at 100. 
 33.  Id. at 160. 
 34.  JOSEPH HOPKINSON, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ABOLITION OF THE COMMON LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES 29 (Philadelphia, William P. Farrand & Co. 1809). 
 35.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
 36.  Id. at 539. 
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 By the law of the land, is most clearly intended, the general law; 
a law, which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon in-
quiry, and renders judgment only after trial.  The meaning is, that 
every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities 
under the protection of the general rules which govern society.  
Everything which may pass under the form of an enactment, [i.e., 
a statute] is not therefore to be considered the law of the land.  If 
this were so . . . [t]here would be no general permanent law for 
courts to administer, or for men to live under.  The administration 
of justice would be an empty form, an idle ceremony.  Judges 
would sit to execute legislative judgments and decrees; not to de-
clare the law or to administer the justice of the country.37 
The horrible of horribles that judges might sit only to execute the legislative 
will proved Webster’s argument.  So much for the deferential parsing of leg-
islative intent! 
Webster’s Dartmouth College argument also revealed a particular vi-
sion of the role lawyers and judges played in the constitutional structure.  If 
statutes could be called “the law of the land,” Webster argued, “[s]uch a 
strange construction would render constitutional provisions of the highest im-
portance completely inoperative and void.”38  It would empower assemblies 
to reverse convictions, summarily transfer property from one citizen to an-
other, or pass bills of attainder, he said.  Lawyers stood in the breach, inter-
posing the Constitution between individual freedom and legislative tyranny. 
Many lawyers described this part of their work as one of the prizes of 
national independence.  In England, the people had “constitutional rights,” 
but if Parliament overstepped its bounds, there was no power that could en-
force those rights.  This infirmity of the British system came sharply to the 
fore during the Stamp, Sugar, and Navigation Act crises in the lead-up to the 
Revolution.  In the United States, by contrast, “the courts are always in fact 
interfering with the government!” bragged Richard Rush, a prominent Re-
publican lawyer.39  He continued: 
Pass but an embargo law; pass but an act for the enlistment of mi-
nors; let the legislature venture to . . . touch with only the pressure 
of a hair the supposed rights of the citizen, and you will soon see 
what a storm will be raised about the ears of their supposed sover-
eign authority.40 
                                                          
 37.  1 DANIEL WEBSTER, SPEECHES AND FORENSIC ARGUMENTS 128 (Boston, Tappan, Whit-
temore & Mason 1843). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  RICHARD RUSH, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 11 (Washington, D.C. 1815).  
 40.  Id. 
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In Rush’s vivid metaphor, drawn from the War of 1812, the lawyer be-
came the American defender against invasion.  “The [U.S.S. Constitution] 
with captain Hull in her, did not come down upon the Gurriere in a spirit of 
more daring and triumphant energy than the Philadelphia or New York law-
yers will sometimes do upon a statute that happens to run a little amiss!”41  
The American lawyer’s ability to challenge a statute marked a sharp differ-
ence between British and American jurisprudence, a “burst[] of intellectual 
and forensick rebellion . . . having [its] seat in the very soul of liberty.”42 
Many judges, too, expected to “interfere” with government.  Indeed, 
some judges found it difficult to see how legislatures could do their work 
without intervention.  Vermont jurist Nathaniel Chipman explained, 
“[J]udges, from the nature of their official employment, are informed of the 
difficulties, which arise in the interpretation of the laws, and of those cases, 
in which they prove deficient, unequal, or unjust in their operation.  Such 
information is highly necessary to the legislative body.”43  Poorly drafted, 
inconsistently publicized, and redundant statutes complicated the administra-
tion of justice, said St. George Tucker, and “render[ed] a complete acquaint-
ance with the laws of this country, one of the most difficult of human ac-
quirements.”44  Apart from these practical considerations, the threat of 
unconstitutional statutes was always present.  Supreme Court Associate Jus-
tice James Wilson explained that although “provision has been made,” in 
both the Pennsylvania state constitution and the federal Constitution, “to pre-
vent or to check precipitancy and intemperance, in the exercise of the all-
important power of legislation” yet there is “too much reason to apprehend 
that . . . the people, at once subjects and sovereigns . . . [will be] tempted to 
alleviate or to alter the restraints, which they have imposed upon them-
selves.”45  With these challenges in view, judges did not expect to remain 
passive.  As Justice Wilson put it: 
 Far be it from me to avail myself of the abuse [of the legislative 
power], and to urge it against the enjoyment of freedom.  But while 
I prize the inestimable blessing highly as I do, I surely ought, in 
every character which I bear, to suggest, to recommend, and to per-
form everything in my power, in order to guard its enjoyment from 
abuse.46 
                                                          
 41.  Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 126 (Rutland, J. 
Lyon 1793). 
 44.  ST. GEORGE TUCKER, VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH 
SELECTED WRITINGS 11 (1999). 
 45.  2 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 55 (Chicago, Callaghan & Company 
1896). 
 46.  Id. at 56. 
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It is impossible to know whether lawyers in general held such views or 
whether these were the opinions of the few who left voluminous papers re-
cording their thoughts on law and society.  But among those we can survey 
today, this mistrust of legislatures and the related view of the role of the legal 
profession was not limited to lawyers and judges who held a particular polit-
ical orientation—at least not at first.  That Daniel Webster and Richard Rush 
would have agreed on this issue, even though they were vocal supporters of 
opposing parties, suggests that these views cannot be dismissed as “political.”  
Like many of his generation, Kent never gave up this essential wariness of 
legislative work.  It does not mark Kent an extremist, therefore, that he almost 
invariably narrowed, invalidated, or interpreted with creative license the stat-
utes that were at issue in cases before him. 
II.  CHANCELLOR KENT, STATUTORY REVISION, AND STATUTORY REVIEW 
ON THE COUNCIL OF REVISION 
James Kent once wrote in the strongest terms about the importance of 
separation of powers.  A free government like that of New York State must 
show “a marked separation of the legislative and judicial powers,” he said.47  
“[T]he power that makes is not the power to construe a law” because “the 
union of these two powers is tyranny.”48  Looking over his life’s work, 
though, it is clear Kent meant something different than what we would mean 
if we were to repeat these maxims today.49 
While in public office as a judge, Kent also served New York in two 
essentially legislative capacities: as a reviser of New York’s statutes and, 
throughout his public career, as a member of the Council of Revision (despite 
the similarity of the titles, the two jobs have nothing to do with one another).  
When redrafting New York’s statute law and while on the Council, sending 
statutes back to the legislature to be rewritten, Kent’s tone was anything but 
deferential.  He did not seem at all worried that he was stepping over a sacred 
boundary line—quite the contrary. 
Kent had been in public office for just a few years when the legislature 
asked him to assist in the revision of New York’s code.  But he brought to 
                                                          
 47.  Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  One feels the same sense of unreality reading Edmund Pendleton’s statement on the im-
portance of separation of powers in Turner v. Turner’s Ex’x.,  8 Va. (4 Call) 234 (1792).  In a case 
that asked him to consider the application of a statute which he had helped to draft, he wrote, sternly,  
  It is the business of legislators to make the laws; and of the judges to expound them.  
Having made the law, the legislative have no authority afterwards to explain its operation 
upon things already done under it.  They . . . cannot prescribe a rule of construction . . . .  
[This is a] power to be deprecated, as oppressive and contrary to the principles of the 
constitution. 
Turner, 8 Va. (4 Call) at 237. 
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the task the expansive vision and sense of statesmanship that would charac-
terize all his life’s work.  He also brought a certain audacity: not only did he 
think he knew what was best for New York in all areas of public concern but 
he seemed to feel it was his special duty to see his vision realized.  One reason 
for this is surely the attitude toward legislatures discussed in the preceding 
section.  But it may well have been exactly what the legislature expected of 
him.  New York was a developing polity—its legal and political infrastruc-
ture was not yet in place.  Perhaps the legislature thought—as Kent certainly 
did—that specially trained legal minds were needed in order to shape the 
body of New York’s written law and put the state on the right track.  Kent 
would say, more than once, that “[l]egal learning is . . . indispensable to all 
persons who are invited to . . . make, amend, and digest the law of the land.”50 
In 1800, the legislature commissioned Kent and his fellow New York 
Supreme Court Justice, Jacob Radcliff to revise New York’s statutes.  This 
sort of statutory spring cleaning occurred in most states every few decades in 
the nineteenth century as legislators, realizing that a mass of antiquated, re-
dundant, and unworkable legislation had piled up, cast around for someone 
they could trust to clear out the old and identify more clearly which laws were 
actually in force.51  This work concerned the public acts—that minority of 
laws on the statute books that were generally applicable—rather than legis-
lative grants to individuals or corporations.  Kent said that he and Radcliff,  
left 76 public acts unrevised, as they had never been altered or 
amended by any subsequent law, and made a list of a great number 
of acts relating to particular subjects and to corporate rights, and 
which being partly executed could not be properly reenacted.  A 
long list of acts deemed obsolete or private was also made.52 
They reduced the original 400 statutes to a final compilation of 115.53 
Kent and Radcliff had been commissioned to do the work of revision 
together, but Kent performed the majority of the work himself, revising sixty-
                                                          
 50.  JAMES KENT, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE LAW ASSOCIATION OF THE CITY OF 
NEW-YORK, OCT. 21ST, 1836, at 6 (New York, G. & C. Carvill & Co. 1836) (emphasis added). 
 51.  The process of revision sometimes introduced difficult questions into statutory interpreta-
tion cases.  Judges seeking the intent of the legislature had to also inquire about whether ambiguities 
or new meanings introduced by revisers formed part of the legislative intent or might be ignored as 
clerical errors.  See, e.g., White v. Wilcox, 1 Conn. 347, 349 n.a (1815) (“Whether the committee 
of revision in digesting the materials of the present statute, or the legislature in giving it their sanc-
tion, intended to vary the act of 1744 in substance, or only to adapt its phraseology to its new con-
nexions [sic], must, at this day, rest upon conjecture.”). 
 52.  John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 547, 574 n.136 (1993) (quoting James Kent, Manuscript entry at flyleaf (n.d.), located in 
Kent’s copy of 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK (New York, Hugh Gaine 1789) (New York 
State Library, Albany, Manuscripts and Special Collections, James Kent Law Book Collection))). 
 53.  Id. 
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three statutes to Radcliff’s twenty-seven.54  This labor-intensive task required 
Kent to comprehend the details of every kind of legislative concern including, 
among other things, land use, crime, master-servant relations, morality, bank-
ruptcy, taxation, as well as the regulation of highways, various New York 
industries, professional licensing, and the procedural rules of the state’s 
courts.  It also required an intimate understanding of the origin of these laws 
and sensitivity to how the social, political, or economic realities of the present 
day might necessitate amendments. 
Kent recalled that “[t]he most laborious and difficult part of their task 
was to abridge and improve the style, and to note imperfections on the former 
acts, and especially in those, which in the preceding revision, had been taken 
from the old English Statutes.”55  This characterization significantly under-
states his role.  Kent’s amendments did include some updates that were 
merely stylistic, or obviously necessary, and which could be termed “abridg-
ments,” “improvements in style,” or the correction of “imperfections.”  In 
many cases, however, Kent also revised the law to suit his opinions about 
good policy, the public welfare, and what due process required. 
At first glance, some revisions might seem to fit the description “mere 
corrections.”  For example, many statutes, borrowed directly from England, 
were medieval in origin and needed updating to better reflect New York’s 
cultural context.  But as perfunctory and mechanical as fixing an anachronism 
may seem, one example suffices to show that even these required Kent to 
alter the law substantially.  “AN ACT for the better apprehending of felons,” 
was a medieval law requiring any witness to a felony to raise a hue and cry.56  
                                                          
 54.  James Kent, Manuscript entry at back flyleaf (n.d.), located in Kent’s copy of 1 LAWS OF 
THE STATE OF NEW-YORK (Charles R. & George Webster eds., 1802) (Columbia Law School Li-
brary, Manuscripts and Special Collections, James Kent Law Book Collection).  Kent notes which 
of the acts in that volume he worked on: 
Mem. Of the Acts of the 24th Session in this Vol. commonly called the revised acts those 
which were drafted by me and culled and digested from the former Acts, were those 
designated by Chapters - 8, 9, 11, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 
51, 52, 53, 54, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 98, 
105, 113, 116, 121, 124, 130, 131, 133, 137, 138, 146, 158, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 
173, 184, 186, 189.  Those which were drafted by Judge Radcliff, were those designated 
by Chapters—10, 13, 24, 25, 30, 33, 43, 44, 61, 64, 77, 79, 110, 115, 125, 135, 147, 155, 
156, 174, 176, 178, 180, 183, 185, 187, 188.   
Id.  Radcliff consistently took responsibility for the statutes dealing with elections—methods of 
counting votes, district divisions, and the qualifications and duties of various elected offices.  He 
also took some of the cases dealing with judicial business, including, for example, the jurisdiction 
of the probate court.  Kent took most of the statutes dealing with the judiciary and almost everything 
else.  And when Radcliff strayed outside of his two areas of expertise, he sometimes left inconsist-
encies or gaps that Kent would have to smooth away when those statutes came before the court at 
trial.  See, e.g., Link v. Beuner, 3 Cai. 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
 55.  Langbein, supra note 52, at 574 n.136 (quoting Kent, supra note 52, at flyleaf (n.d.)). 
 56.  An Act for the Better Apprehending of Felons, ch. 20 (Feb. 14, 1787), reprinted in 2 LAWS 
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK PASSED AT THE SESSIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE HELD IN THE YEARS 
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Once the call of “thief!” or “arson!” had gone up, the statute required all 
“lawful men” to chase after the felon.57  To ensure that there would be enough 
chasers to immediately apprehend the wrongdoer, the statute required all men 
to keep themselves armed and ready for immediate pursuit or face a fine.  
This type of statute dated from an age before professional policing when “cit-
izens had to undertake the core law-enforcement functions that we now del-
egate to police forces, including immediate pursuit of criminals.”58  But in 
nineteenth-century New York, this system, relying on citizen-vigilantes, was 
unnecessary, antiquated, and more of a threat than support to civil order.  
Kent’s version replaced the hue and cry with posted notices, and only profes-
sional police—“sheriffs, coroners, constables, marshals,” and anyone specif-
ically summoned by those officers for the purpose—could be liable for fail-
ing to make the effort to apprehend the offender.59  This kind of amendment 
may have merely replaced an outdated law with a law describing what actu-
ally occurred when felonies were discovered in Kent’s New York.  But the 
fact that it was Kent and not the legislature who finally made this alteration 
shows how much faith the legislature placed in Kent and just how much such 
updates would require. 
Other revisions were motivated by Kent’s sense of practicality, but even 
on their face, these could not be mistaken for mere “improvements in style.”  
Even practical amendments required a kind of decision making that we would 
think of today as part of the legislative prerogative.  For example, the original 
version of “An ACT to regulate the Practice of Physic and Surgery in this 
State” imposed stringent licensing requirements on all medical practitioners 
in New York, requiring them to apprentice for a number of years and receive 
a license attesting to their qualifications from a court of record.60  The only 
exception in the original law was for out-of-state physicians who received a 
request for assistance from a physician licensed in New York.61  Kent’s re-
vised version expanded the exception in the law to allow patients to hire out-
of-state doctors to treat their ailments in New York, and it allowed those out-
of-state physicians three months to practice in New York before licensure 
                                                          
1785, 1786, 1787 AND 1788, INCLUSIVE 390–91 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Company 1885).  To 
see its roots in medieval law, see 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE 
HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 578–80 (2d ed. 1898). 
 57.  An Act for the Better Apprehending of Felons, ch. 20 (Feb. 14, 1787). 
 58.  JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 22 n.2 (2009); see also H. R. T. Summerson, The Struc-
ture of Law Enforcement in Thirteenth Century England, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 313, 317 (1979). 
 59.  1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 218 (Albany, Charles R. & George Webster 1802). 
 60.  Act of Mar. 23, 1797, ch. 45, 417–19 (1797), reprinted in 4 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW 
YORK PASSED AT THE SESSIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE HELD IN THE YEARS 1797, 1798, 1799 AND 
1800, INCLUSIVE 61–63 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Company 1887). 
 61.  Id. at 63. 
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laws would begin to apply.62  The new law may have suited a lawmaker pri-
marily concerned with patient autonomy, but the original version may well 
have reflected a greater concern for public safety, addressing the fear that 
out-of-state practitioners might not live up to New York standards.  The orig-
inal version of the law may have made it harder for a patient to obtain treat-
ment from the doctor they preferred, but it ensured that foreign practitioners 
would be under the supervision of a locally licensed doctor.  Or, the old law 
may have reflected the lobbying influence of local physicians, who wanted a 
shield from out-of-state competition.  So Kent’s revision may have impli-
cated a policy choice—downplaying a concern for public safety in an unreg-
ulated market for medical services out of preference for the value of maxi-
mum patient choice.  Or, it may have reflected Kent’s decision to reduce the 
influence of a powerful constituent group.  Either way, these are exactly the 
kinds of concerns legislatures debate and struggle over before passing law 
and which we would consider to be in the core of their purview. 
Then there were changes justified neither by historical change nor prac-
ticality but instead merely by Kent’s own ideas of how society should be run.  
In his amendments to “AN ACT to prevent excessive and deceitful Gam-
ing,”63 which the 1788 legislature had copied directly from the English stat-
ute,64 Kent got rid of excess words and anachronistic references to specific 
games and changed the currency of the fines from pounds to dollars—all mi-
nute and uncontroversial amendments.65  But Kent also changed the penalty 
for cheating at games of chance from corporal punishment to six months im-
prisonment.66  This was in keeping with other recently reenacted criminal 
statutes, which had eliminated most instances of corporal punishment.  But it 
was also an expression of Kent’s belief, as he put it, that public whipping was 
a punishment “calculated not to reform but to harden offenders, because it 
covers them with indelible disgrace” and that it was “injurious to the specta-
tors, because [it] naturally excites disgust in some, and hardens sensibility in 
others.”67  Not every member of New York’s legislature shared Kent’s views 
                                                          
 62.  1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 450–52 (Charles R. & George Webster eds., 1802). 
 63.  An Act to Prevent Excessive and Deceitful Gaming, ch. 35 (Feb. 20, 1788), reprinted in 2 
LAWS OF THE STATES OF NEW YORK PASSED AT THE SESSIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE HELD IN THE 
YEARS 1785, 1786, 1787, AND 1788, INCLUSIVE 662–53 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Company 
1885). 
 64.  See Act for the Better Preventing of Excessive and Deceitful Gaming 1710, 9 Ann. c. 19 
(Eng.). 
 65.  An Act to Prevent Excessive and Deceitful Gaming, ch. 46 (Mar. 21, 1801), reprinted in 5 
LAWS OF THE STATES OF NEW YORK PASSED AT THE SESSIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE HELD IN THE 
YEARS 1801, at 70–72 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Company 1887). 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  ALFRED B. STREET, THE COUNCIL OF REVISION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 348 (Al-
bany, William Gould 1859) (providing James Kent’s opinion on the pending legislation, “An act 
relative to certain crimes therein mentioned”). 
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on whipping.  In fact, at least two statutes imposing corporal punishment 
passed in the legislature subsequently, although these acts did not survive the 
Council of Revision veto.68 
Some of Kent’s amendments showed that he believed his task included 
changing statutes borrowed from English law to conform to the republican 
context in which they would now be used.  He made several substantive 
amendments to the “Act relative to Treason,” which had been identical to the 
English Act of 1695–1696.69  One of his changes was a new provision spec-
ifying that the penalties imposed on the convicted traitor would not extend to 
his kin and that the convicted traitor’s wife would not forfeit her dower.70  
Kent described dower as “a right or title which . . . the wife acquired at the 
time of her marriage, and which continues indefeasible unless she be divested 
of it by her own act or consent.”71  He believed that forfeiture of the wife’s 
dower upon the husband’s conviction “[took] away a legal right already at-
tached and vested” and constituted “a violation of the rights of property . . . 
contrary to the spirit of the Constitution.”72  The legislature disagreed, how-
ever.  Only four years later, a new bill was proposed, restoring the forfeiture 
penalty in cases of treason.  Kent warned the legislature the law was, 
unjust because it is retrospective in its nature, and creates disabili-
ties arising from crimes after they have been once tried and pun-
ished; and it is unlawful because it is . . . [an] ex post facto law, and 
because it inflicts new punishment for acts committed during the 
late war, contrary to the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace.73 
The bill passed over these objections with a majority sufficient to defeat 
Kent’s Council of Revision veto. 
The dower law was one instance in which the legislature specifically 
disapproved of one of Kent’s alterations, but it was a rare exception.  What 
Kent did when he revised the statutes was quintessentially legislative, and he 
did it with the legislature’s permission and gratitude.  After this work was 
completed, he maintained a sense of ownership over these statutes.  His copy 
of the book of revised laws shows that he kept notes on amendments and 
                                                          
 68.  See id. at 332. 
 69.  See Act for regulateing of Tryals in Cases of Treason and Misprision of Treason 1695–
1696, 7 & 8 Will. 3 c. 3 (Eng.). 
 70.  1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 216 (Charles R. & George Webster, eds., 1802). 
 71.  STREET, supra note 67, at 333 (providing James Kent’s opinion with respect to “An act 
relative to dower in certain cases therein mentioned”). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id.  
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interpretations of all of the laws, but he was particularly diligent about anno-
tating the statutes he had redrafted.74 
He also kept close watch over those statutes from his position on the 
Council of Revision.  The Council of Revision, composed of the governor, 
the three justices on the New York Supreme Court, and the chancellor, met 
to review legislation before it became law and had the power to veto statutes 
as unconstitutional or as against public policy.  When it voted to strike down 
legislation, the Council would send its decision to the legislature with a mem-
orandum explaining the reasons motivating the veto.  The Senate and Assem-
bly could override that veto with the votes of a two-thirds majority.75  Like 
his work as a reviser, Kent’s position on the Council gave him power over 
legislation, but unlike the ad hoc work of revision, this role had been created 
by the state’s constitution.  Here, Kent’s sense of ownership over statutes and 
his wariness toward the legislature seem like natural outgrowths of his ex-
plicit responsibility to guard against legislative overreaching and thought-
lessness.  But it is nevertheless surprising to read Kent’s memoranda, which 
are sometimes written to the legislature in the tone of an exasperated school-
master.  It is also surprising to see just how legislative his role actually was: 
Kent was a member of the Council because he was a judge—first a justice, 
then chief justice of the New York Supreme Court, and then chancellor—but 
only rarely did his memoranda draw on his judicial expertise. 
More often, the expertise Kent displayed was that of the statute reviser, 
not that of a mere interpreter.  Having put together New York’s “Act to Re-
duce the Laws Concerning Wills into one Statute,” for example, he took 
every opportunity to impede private bills by which the legislature threatened 
to obscure the clear lines he had drawn.  For example, an 1820 private bill, 
“An act relative to the Roman Catholic Benevolent Society in the city of New 
York,” sought to establish that a devise contained in the will of a recently 
deceased New Yorker deeding his house and lot to St. Peter’s Church, in trust 
for the use of an orphanage, was “valid and effectual in the law.”76  In his 
memorandum to the legislature, Kent pointed out,  
the devise here alluded to is either valid or not valid . . . .  If valid, 
then the provision in the bill is entirely useless.  If not valid, as the 
bill evidently supposes, then the house and lot . . . either descended 
to his heirs at law, or escheated to the State for the want of compe-
tent heirs.77 
                                                          
 74.  See notations throughout Kent’s copy of 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK (Charles 
R. & George Webster eds., 1802) (Columbia Law School Library, Manuscripts and Special Collec-
tions, James Kent Law Book Collection). 
 75.  STREET, supra note 67, at 5–6. 
 76.  Id. at 388. 
 77.  Id. at 388–89. 
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If the property had escheated to the state, the legislature was free to give 
the property for the use of the orphanage.  But if the deceased New Yorker 
had heirs, “the Legislature cannot divest those heirs of the estate for any pur-
pose whatever, without their consent, or without making them just compen-
sation.”78 
In another case, Kent chided the legislature for passing a private bill that 
appointed trustees to sell the property of infant heirs of another deceased New 
Yorker.79  He reminded the assembly, “[t]he general law of the land vests the 
estate of the ancestor in his heirs, and it ought not to be taken from them 
without their consent, unless under peculiar and strong circumstances really 
existing and duly disclosed.”80  He found the circumstances of the bill in 
question suspicious, insofar as: 
[t]he trustees named in this bill are left to dispose of the real estate 
of the children . . . without any direction as to the time and mode 
of the sale, and they are left to deduct their reasonable costs and 
charges without any tribunal to guide their discretion or to deter-
mine what costs and charges are reasonable.81 
He believed that this kind of bill could only be “dangerous to the rights 
of property, and pernicious as a precedent.”82  In both cases he managed to 
persuade the legislature not to pass the bills, and he continued to keep a close 
watch on this area of legislation.  “[T]he law of descent is so vast and so 
constant in its operations,” he warned in another memorandum to the legis-
lature, “that it ought not to be disturbed for any light or transient cause.”83 
His expertise as a reviser was also on display when he prevented the 
Senate, more than once, from reenacting statutes from the eighteenth century.  
Kent had worked with those laws and knew them intimately.  In one instance, 
he criticized the Senate’s attempt to reenact a vast, obsolete eighteenth-cen-
tury property law in order to get the benefit of two short provisions of that 
law.  To reenact the law in total would be improper, he counseled, “for by the 
first section of the bill there is a very formal abolition of estates in tail; which 
would imply that such estates still existed,” among other reasons.84  He also 
had occasion to scold the legislature for enacting redundant laws, as he did 
in 1813, over “An act limiting the period of bringing claims and prosecutions 
                                                          
 78.  Id. at 389. 
 79.  Id. at 358–59 (providing James Kent’s opinion on “An act for the relief of the heirs of 
Thomas H. Taylor, deceased”). 
 80.  Id. at 359. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. at 374 (showing James Kent’s views on “An act concerning joint tenants and tenants in 
tail, regulating descents and abolishing entails”). 
 84.  Id. at 373. 
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against forfeited estates.”85  The act “appears to have been intended to be a 
revised bill . . . rëenacting the statute of . . . 1797,” but, he explained, 
whereas that law had never been altered or amended, and was not 
within the purview of the general revision of the laws, and being a 
permanent statute affecting a very extensive portion of real estate, 
it is at least useless, and may be injurious to the stability of these 
rights to repeal and reënact it.86 
He was also vigilant against the reenactment of statutes that he, as the reviser 
of New York’s statute books, had decided to drop from the books.87 
Although many of Kent’s memoranda from the Council of Revision 
showed his expertise as a statute drafter and reviser, Kent was not, nor did he 
pretend to be, a mere technician.  While on the Council of Revision, many of 
Kent’s arguments against statutes were neither legal nor practical—they were 
based on his opinions about the legislature’s policy choices.  His decisions 
on policy issues show a broad involvement in the governance of the State of 
New York.  For instance, one important debate in the Council concerned 
whether to allow legislation creating the Erie Canal to go forward, or to veto 
it in order to keep money in reserve in case of a military emergency.  Kent 
cast the final vote in favor, explaining, “[I]f we must have a war, or have a 
canal, I am in favor of the canal!  I vote for the bill!”88  Not every policy 
discussion in the Council of Revision dealt with such grand matters of state 
as the choice between allocating resources for infrastructure or militarization.  
But throughout his career, Kent occupied roles in which he was partner with 
the legislature in every way.  He revised legislation and then worked to make 
sure the legislature understood and preserved the laws as revised.  He sat in 
review of the legislature’s work, and not just for constitutionality.  He took 
positions on the future of New York state policy in areas of legislative con-
cern and, together with the other members of the Council of Revision, he 
exercised a veto power over the legislature when it passed bills in disagree-
ment with his views. 
A.  Kent’s Style of Statutory Interpretation 
Kent believed that statutory law was meant to track the ways in which 
the legal needs of a young republic, and of New York in particular, differed 
from England.  In interpreting these enactments in legal cases, Kent could 
                                                          
 85.  Id. at 376. 
 86.  Id.; see also id. at 367 (objecting to an 1812 bill as “totally useless, an adequate remedy 
being provided by the seventh section of the act entitled ‘an act concerning idiots, lunatics and infant 
trustees’”). 
 87.  Id. at 333. 
 88.  WILLIAM KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT, LL.D., LATE CHANCELLOR OF 
THE STATE OF NEW YORK 170 (Boston, Little, Brown & Company 1898). 
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not set aside his experiences as a statute drafter or as a policymaker on the 
Council of Revision.  Therefore, he didn’t hesitate to toss English precedents 
aside when they clashed with his understanding of the practical requirements 
of New York governance or republican values.  He felt free to do so even 
when the New York legislature had adopted English statutes wholesale.  In a 
much-cited case in which he decided that filing in a mortgage registry con-
stitutes notice to subsequent purchasers of land, he said, defiantly, a “contrary 
doctrine would shake the foundation of all mortgage security, and lead to 
every species of fraud.”89  He was so certain of this, he said, “[n]o decisions 
of the English Courts, upon the English registry acts . . . could induce me to 
change my opinion on the construction of our statute.”90 
Indeed, in statutory interpretation cases, one finds that Kent rarely rested 
on stare decisis unless he could rely on a previous opinion of his own.91  He 
felt “at liberty to give [New York statutes] such a construction as will best 
accord with the obvious dictates of its policy” whether he found precedent to 
support that construction or not.92  Without this freedom, he would have been 
unable to create a consistent jurisprudence in various areas of law.  Nor, as 
we shall see, did he feel much bound by any other source of earthly authority.  
While he did occasionally say “[i]t is the province of the legislative, and not 
of the judicial power, to change the law,”93 he nevertheless almost always 
found the law he was looking for hidden in the text that the legislature pro-
vided. 
This is perhaps the most telling thing about Kent’s method of statutory 
interpretation: while employing it, he almost never read a statute whose 
meaning he disapproved of.  And when he did disapprove of a statute, he 
always found himself able to cheerfully invalidate the law on constitutional 
grounds and grant an injunction to the plaintiff pending a legislative amend-
ment.  This is not entirely explained by the multiple hats he wore in New 
York governance.  His success in always reading the law he wished to read 
is partly explained by his ambition to anchor New York’s jurisprudence in 
consistent principles and secure its constitutional values—an ambition he re-
alized by taking on a role that can be best described as nation-building, and 
                                                          
 89.  Parkist v. Alexander, 1 Johns. Ch. 394, 398 (N.Y. Ch. 1815). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  This contrasts with his treatment of cases arising under the common law, in which he did 
follow the guidance of English precedent with regularity.  Therefore, when Kent’s biographer cel-
ebrates how Kent “seldom in equity [or] in law, allowed his course to be deflected from the beaten 
English paths,” he is at least half right.  JOHN THEODORE HORTON, JAMES KENT: A STUDY IN 
CONSERVATISM, 1763–1847, at 204 (1969); see id. at 207 & nn. 29–30 (citing cases in which Kent 
followed the English common law precedent despite personal misgivings). 
 92.  Parkist, 1 Johns. Ch. at 400. 
 93.  Manning v. Manning, 1 Johns. Ch. 527, 534 (N.Y. Ch. 1815). 
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it is partly explained by his attitude, a sometimes sanctimonious sense of pre-
rogative which he armored with erudition.  And it is partly explained by 
methods of statutory interpretation, including “equitable interpretation” 
which, as we have seen, Kent’s contemporaries would not have seen as out-
landish. 
By the early nineteenth century, some of the most respected jurists of 
Kent’s day insisted that judges were required to use their equitable powers 
when interpreting statutes in order to take into account the spirit of the laws 
they were interpreting and to supply whatever details the legislature may 
have overlooked.  In his celebrated law lectures at what would become the 
University of Pennsylvania, constitutional framer and Associate Supreme 
Court Justice James Wilson described all proper statutory interpretation as an 
exercise in “equity”: 
 By Aristotle, equity is thus defined—“the correction of that, in 
which the law is defective, by being too general.”  In making laws, 
it is impossible to specify or to foresee every case . . . in interpret-
ing them, those cases should be excepted, which the legislator him-
self, had he foreseen them, would have specified and excepted.  
Such interpretation . . . is drawn from the spirit of the law, or the 
motive which prevailed on the legislature to make it.  When equity 
is taken in this sense, every court of law is also a court of equity.  
When equity is taken in this sense—and, applied to the interpreta-
tion of law, this is its genuine meaning—it is an expression syn-
onimous [sic] to true and sound construction.94 
Kent’s methods were therefore not unique, and he brought special in-
sight to the task of interpretation.  Kent had thought more deeply than anyone 
else in New York State—members of the legislature included—about the 
spirit of New York’s statute laws.  He knew how related laws fit together to 
express unified policy and governance objectives, because he had decided on 
those objectives and shaped the laws to bend toward those goals, both 
through the process of revision and in his ongoing role as a member of the 
Council of Revision.  His style of interpretation, therefore, could not help but 
borrow from this expertise and continue that work. 
In this Section, I will first look at Kent’s style of interpretation when the 
statutes at issue created private rights.  This shows how Kent used canons of 
construction and how Kent’s use differed from how modern judges use the 
same tools.  I then look at how Kent interpreted public acts.  Kent’s interpre-
tation of public acts gives us some measure of how far the office of his judge-
ship differed from that of a modern judge, especially given that some of the 
                                                          
 94.  2 JAMES WILSON, THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, LL.D. 260 (Phila-
delphia, Bird Wilson 1804) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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cases before him involved statutes that he also vetted while sitting on the 
Council of Revision. 
B.  Kent’s Interpretation of Acts Creating Private Rights 
When interpreting a private act, Kent’s work was closest in style to what 
modern lawyers might expect from a judicial opinion.  Like a modern judge, 
Kent began with the text of the statute, parsing the plain meaning of the terms 
relevant to the dispute before him.  But this was the end of any similarity 
between his methods and modern interpretive jurisprudence.  That is because 
Kent believed, as he would make clear years later in his Commentaries, that 
the mere letter of an act—even where it yielded an unambiguous plain mean-
ing—could not displace the judges’ understanding of what the legislature 
must have (or ought to have) intended.95 
But if not from the letter of the act, how was a judge to know what the 
legislature intended?  As one mid-nineteenth-century judge explained: 
[I]t is also a well settled rule in construing statutes, that the occa-
sion and necessity of the law, from the mischief felt and the remedy 
in view, are to be considered: for, from these may be collected the 
intention of the lawgiver, which, when discovered, is to be fol-
lowed, although it may lead to a construction seemingly contrary 
to the letter.96 
Like other judges of his day, Kent relied on the “mischief rule” first 
articulated in Heydon’s Case in 1584 and catalogued in Mathew Bacon’s 
1736 New Abridgement of the Law.97  In doing so, Kent did not seek the leg-
islature’s purpose in the records of legislative debates or other circumstantial 
evidence that might have revealed the legislators’ actual intent.  Instead, he 
focused his analysis on what the legislature should have intended, using as a 
guide his own sense of the background law and what he believed were proper 
legislative goals.  Once he had identified a statute’s purpose this way, Kent 
relied on two other principles of construction.  First, Kent often started from 
the presumption—commonly invoked in nineteenth-century opinions—that 
“[s]tatutes made for the public good, and for general and beneficent national 
                                                          
 95.  1 KENT, supra note 22, at 432. 
 96.  Humbert v. St. Stephen’s Church, 1 Edw. Ch. 308, 312 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) (citing 1 KENT, 
supra note 22, at 432); see also Woodruff v. State, 3 Ark. 285, 285 (1841) (“Such a construction 
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 97.  Heydon’s Case (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 639; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a, 8 a; 4 MATHEW BACON, A 
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purposes, are to receive a very liberal construction”98 while, conversely, stat-
utes for private benefit ought to be read narrowly.  We will see him use this 
canon both to narrow and to broaden statutory language.  Second, he sought 
to situate the statute before him in the context of other enactments that were 
either in pari materia—that is, regarding the same subject matter—or, as was 
more common with private acts, helpfully analogous.  But if this approach 
seems familiar to us today, its application in Kent’s opinions is nevertheless 
remarkable because he was often able to rely for analogy on statutes that he 
himself had rewritten during his years revising New York’s code. 
Kent’s decision in Belknap v. Belknap99 illustrates his application of 
these tools where private interests were at stake.  The statute at issue in Belk-
nap was not a private act, but it had been passed to benefit only a handful of 
citizens.  The Act “for draining swamps and bog meadows, in the counties of 
Orange and Dutchess” enabled one or more of the proprietors of wetlands in 
those counties to have the wetlands drained at the joint expense of all the 
proprietors.100  The Act set up an administrative procedure, providing for the 
appointment of inspectors and assignment of jurisdiction to a court, to deter-
mine the best method for draining a particular piece of land, and it contained 
a section specifying the notice to be given to the other proprietors.101  The 
only mention of non-proprietors was in the sixth section, which provided that 
in case the inspectors found it: 
necessary “to continue such ditch or ditches through lands adjoin-
ing any such tracts of swamp or bog meadow, for the purposes of 
draining the same more effectually, they are authorized to agree 
and settle with the owner or owners of such lands, for such damage 
as is likely, in their opinion, to be sustained by such owner or own-
ers, by reason of such ditch, &c.; and if they cannot agree, the in-
spectors are to apply to the Court to appoint appraisers.”102 
Belknap arose out of a controversy under this section of the act. 
The defendants in Belknap owned a piece of swampland that adjoined a 
large pond.  The inspectors had plotted a course through the swampland for 
a ditch terminating at the pond, but this ditch alone would not be enough to 
drain the swamp because the pond’s water level was too high.  At the opposite 
end of the pond from the swamp, the pond let out into a stream.  The inspec-
tors proposed to cut a ditch to widen this outlet, which would lower the level 
of the water considerably.  Widening the outlet would also, however, destroy 
                                                          
 98.  Jerome v. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. 315, 342 (N.Y. Ch. 1823). 
 99.  2 Johns. Ch. 463 (N.Y. Ch. 1817). 
 100.  Id. at 463–64. 
 101.  Id. at 463. 
 102.  Id. at 469 (emphases added). 
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the value of the pond and its outlet as a source of water for the use of the mills 
downstream.103 
The plaintiffs, all downstream mill owners, brought suit to enjoin the 
ruination of the pond’s outlet.  In answer, the defendants held up a report by 
the inspectors, asserting: “we find it necessary to continue the first-men-
tioned main ditch through lands adjoining said tract of swamp or bog, for the 
purpose of draining the same more effectually, viz. through what is called the 
outlet of the great pond.”104  The question before Chancellor Kent was 
whether the ditch through the outlet could truly be said to “continue” the 
drainage ditch through “adjoining” land, as required under the statute. 
Kent started with the language of the act.  He believed that the defend-
ants were misusing the word “continued”: 
 To continue a line or ditch, does not, in the ordinary or grammat-
ical sense, admit of any intervening substance to break the conti-
nuity.  It implies uninterrupted connection; and the ditch cannot 
properly be said to be continued, by terminating it at the north end 
of the pond, and by deepening the outlet of that pond at the south-
east corner.  We cannot suppose it without indulging in the same 
poetical fiction by which the river Alpheus was continued from 
Greece to Sicily: occultas egisse vias subter mare.105 
He also sided with the plaintiffs on the plain meaning of the word “ad-
joining”: “[t]he ditch was to be continued through lands adjoining, that is, 
through lands next to, and which touched, the swamp or bog meadow; but 
none of the lands of the plaintiffs adjoin the great swamp where the main 
ditch terminates.”106 
Like a modern judge interpreting a statute, Kent started with the text—
so far, his opinion looks familiar.  But this unequivocal plain meaning anal-
ysis, finding that “cutting down the outlet is not within the letter of the per-
mission under the act” was merely the beginning of Kent’s opinion.107  Kent 
still felt it necessary to explain why the court was “not warranted, in this case, 
to construe the power liberally, and to extend it by equity” to cover the de-
fendants’ proposed ditch.108 
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His first step was to assert that private acts (or, in this case, acts granting 
rights to a select group of citizens) should be narrowly construed.  Kent ex-
plained that “[t]his permission to continue the ditch through adjoining lands, 
without the consent of the owner, ought to be strictly construed, and not car-
ried beyond the plain letter of the act” because the defendants’ claim did not 
“concern[] the public, but [was a matter] of mere private convenience and 
profit.”109  He pointed out that the preservation of the outlet in its current form 
was as useful to the plaintiffs as the widening of the outlet was to the defend-
ants, and “the interest of each party has an equal claim on the protection of 
the government; one interest ought not to be made subservient to the 
other.”110  These words contrast with the tone of his opinions, discussed in 
more detail below, interpreting statutes authorizing great public works like 
the Erie Canal. 
Kent also spent part of his opinion discussing what the legislature must 
have intended by the act.  Again, this sounds familiar, but it is not the same 
as what modern judges do when they ask the same question.  It would not 
have made any sense to Kent to search the legislative record to find out what 
the bill’s sponsor said on the floor of the Senate when he introduced it, or to 
read which compromises and deals among assemblymen resulted in the final 
language of the act.  Kent’s version of “what the legislature intended” was 
not concerned with what the actual legislature actually intended.  Instead, 
Kent’s mischief rule concerned what an idealized legislature, schooled in and 
respectful of the background law on the subject, and wishing only to correct 
imperfections in that law as applied, would have intended by the language of 
the act. 
The act in Belknap, on its face, seemed to give the inspectors the author-
ity to widen the outlet and lower the pond if that is what they judged neces-
sary to drain the wetlands.  But this would have been a substantial departure 
from the background legal norm that one private citizen’s property rights and 
desire for private gain are not more valuable or more deserving of the law’s 
protection than another citizen’s property right and vested business interest.  
It would, moreover, have granted sweeping powers to the inspectors.  And 
while it may have been that the legislature fully intended to empower the 
inspectors and favor the wetlands proprietors, under Kent’s analysis, this is 
not what the statute would be read to say. 
Instead, Kent explained that the unfettered powers granted to the inspec-
tors were proof that the legislature could not have intended to go so far.  “It 
is an invasion of the rights of property; and it is evident that the act could 
only have had in view cases of the most immaterial and trifling consequence, 
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or the power would never have been granted with so little check.”111  Analo-
gizing to the Highway Act, he explained: 
 How cautiously and guardedly are powers given, even to public 
officers, to lay out highways for the use of the public, over private 
property.  They are not to be laid out over cultivated grounds, with-
out the certificate of twelve freeholders, that the road is necessary, 
nor through any orchard or garden of four years’ growth, without 
the owner’s consent.  Can we suppose that this act intended that 
these inspectors should carry their ditches where they pleased, 
without any regard to the improvements of others?112 
Kent knew the Highway Act well, of course, because he put it together 
while revising New York statutes.  The purpose and care he imputed to the 
legislature, therefore, was based on an analogy to an act that he had a chance 
to revise and approve in advance.113 
A modern lawyer reading Kent’s opinions may recognize familiar can-
ons of statutory interpretation, some of which we use today in similar con-
texts.  In fact, his cases interpreting private acts use not only the same tools 
but arrive at the same conclusions as many modern judges would.  But the 
similarities can make the differences even more startling.  When Kent inter-
preted the statutes before him in private controversies, he often played a role 
quite different from that of the modern judge.  While a justice and while a 
chancellor, Kent was simultaneously sitting on the Council of Revision and 
actively monitoring the legislature’s amendments to statutes he had revised.  
It is not surprising, therefore, that there was nothing “pure” about his legal 
decisions.  Policy judgments crept into them all the time.  This is not to de-
mean Kent’s stature as a judge—in fact, as one of the greatest judges of his 
century.  It is only to acknowledge that the creature called a judge in early 
nineteenth-century New York is not what we would call a judge today. 
C.  Kent’s Style of Interpretation of Public Acts 
The difference between Kent’s approach to statutory interpretation and 
modern interpretation is all the more striking in his cases dealing with public 
statutes, especially when Kent wrote as a member of the Court for the Cor-
rection of Errors.  The Court for the Correction of Errors was New York’s 
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highest court of appeals, and it comprised the chancellor, all of the state’s 
senators, the lieutenant governor, and the justices of the New York Supreme 
Court.  It heard appeals from both the Court of Chancery and the New York 
Supreme Court.  Because the members of the Court for the Correction of 
Errors were recused from cases which they had decided and because the 
Court’s opinions were usually drafted by a judge, Chancellor Kent would 
write the decision whenever a case was appealed from the New York Su-
preme Court.  With the members of the Supreme Court recused in these cases, 
Kent was the only legal figure on the panel, and as a result, he often had total 
freedom to craft the panel’s rulings.  The resulting opinions do not read like 
the products of collaboration.  They are written entirely in Kent’s voice, and 
their rationales are consistent with Kent’s related cases. 
Kent’s sense of his responsibility to the state emerges very strongly in 
his cases dealing with public acts.  In these decisions, the mischief rule takes 
on a life of its own, justifying leaps of inference so huge that they begin to 
look like flights of fancy.  What his extremely broad constructions reveal, 
however, is that while dealing with public acts, Kent saw himself as a mem-
ber of the policymaking branch of government, not just an interpreter of its 
work.  He was committed to making law that would help to realize the great 
ambitions of the legislature, particularly when he believed that those ambi-
tions were in the best interests of the State of New York. 
Rogers v. Bradshaw114 was one of these cases.  Three statutes were in-
volved.  The first, passed in 1816, empowered commissioners appointed to 
oversee the construction of the Erie Canal to enter private lands as needed to 
explore and examine the most eligible routes and to make surveys, levels, 
and plans to fix the canal’s final route.115  The second statute, passed in 1817, 
empowered the commissioners to: 
enter upon and use . . . any [public or privately owned] lands, wa-
ters, and streams, necessary for the prosecution of the improve-
ments intended by the act, and to make all such canals, locks, dams, 
and other works and devices, as they might think proper, for mak-
ing said improvements; doing, nevertheless, no unnecessary dam-
age.116 
This statute included a clause requiring the commissioners to estimate 
the damages to any person whose lands were confiscated and to pay compen-
sation.117  The third statute, passed in 1820, required canal commissioners to 
create and render passable a new public road in any part of the state where 
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canal work would destroy an existing public road and to register the change 
of the road’s location at the appropriate county office.118 
The controversy in Rogers v. Bradshaw arose when the commissioners 
found that the best route for the canal cut through a turnpike.119  With this 
road disrupted, the commissioners realized that another road would need to 
be built in the vicinity to facilitate the transport of construction materials.  In 
anticipation of destroying the turnpike to dig the canal, the commissioners 
plotted a course for the new road through Bradshaw’s private land.  Accord-
ing to Bradshaw, the road crew had cut fifty dollars’ worth of his timber be-
fore he filed suit.120 
The Supreme Court of New York ruled for Bradshaw.  That court held 
that the land was not taken for “canal improvements” at all—a substitute road 
was nothing like a “lock” or a “dam”—and that the taking, therefore, did not 
come within the powers granted by the act of 1817.121  The court also held 
that the commissioners could not claim the power to take Bradshaw’s land 
under the 1820 road act because a turnpike—a privately owned and operated 
toll road—was not a “public road or highway.”122  The court also pointed out 
that the 1820 road act contained no provision for compensating landowners, 
so any reading of the act that allowed the commissioners to take Bradshaw’s 
land would render the act unconstitutional.123 
Kent reversed.  He began his opinion with a logical argument.  The 
plaintiff had argued that a new road was not an improvement necessary to the 
construction of the canal.  Kent pointed out, 
if the turnpike road was unavoidably encroached on by the canal, 
and another road was indispensible at that place, before the canal 
was commenced, and the land taken was necessary for the road, 
(and all this was proved in the cause,) it would seem to follow, as 
a clear logical deduction, that the land taken was necessary for the 
prosecution of the improvements intended by the act.124 
But Kent couldn’t rest his opinion there because there were good argu-
ments from the text of the statute against this “clear logical deduction,” and 
he had to refute the much narrower interpretation of the statute that all of the 
justices of the New York Supreme Court had agreed on in the decision below. 
Kent therefore focused on what he saw as the underlying issue and the 
crux of his disagreement with the court over how to interpret the statute: just 
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how much authority did three canal statutes mean to grant the commission-
ers?  In Kent’s view, that authority was sweeping.  Again, his opinion relied 
on the canon that public acts are to be broadly construed.  He began his opin-
ion with this observation: 
 This [1816] act was the commencement of that great undertak-
ing, which, in the language of one of our statutes, was “to advance 
the prosperity and elevate the character of the United States.”  It 
began by sketching out the duty of the commissioners upon a lib-
eral scale, and with just confidence in their discretion.  They were 
to explore and examine lands, and to cause surveys and levels to 
be taken.  Nothing was said about impediments to be thrown in 
their way by trespasses upon private right, or that they were to 
make the course of the canal bend to the interest, or the unreason-
ableness of individuals.125 
Compare this to his much more cautious approach in Belknap.  There, 
he judged that the legislature’s silence on limits to the officer’s powers im-
plied that those powers were only to be used sparingly.  Here, he argued, 
“[s]urely, a statute, vesting large powers, resting very much for their exercise 
in undefined discretion, and checked only by the gentle admonition of doing 
‘no unnecessary damage,’ ought to be construed more benignly and more 
liberally.”126  He did not have to rest his opinion on his judgment that the new 
road was in fact an improvement required for the canal.  He could rest it on 
the authority of the canal commissioners to make any decision as to what the 
canal required, so long as those decisions were made in good faith and were 
not an egregious abuse of their powers. 
The difference between Kent’s treatment of the commissioners here and 
the inspectors in Belknap was that the canal statutes concerned a grand public 
works project, one which would be impossible “[i]f private rights of every 
description were not to give way . . . to the permanent interest of the pub-
lic.”127  His broad construction was just what Justice Wilson described as 
“equity”—supplying details to statutes that the legislature would have added 
if only they had considered the question before the court.  When Kent inter-
preted words in a public statute, it was not enough to ask after their plain 
meaning and go from there.  Instead, he wrote, “we [must] give to the expres-
sions the sense most suitable to the subject, and best adapted to the facility 
and success of a great and generous scheme of public policy.”128 
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The success of the Erie Canal required that Kent read the expressions in 
the statute as granting the commissioners a great deal of discretion.  A mod-
ern judge might employ the canon that the legislature is not to be presumed 
to have intended an absurd or manifestly unjust result.129  Kent believed that 
“[e]very interpretation which leads to an absurdity, or to embarrass or defeat 
the purposes of the statute, is to be avoided.”130  The practical consequence 
of the New York Supreme Court’s reading was that “[t]he line of the canal 
must have been either diverted from its course . . . or else the progress of the 
canal must have been suspended, until an opportunity was given for an ap-
plication to the legislature for new powers.”131  Kent concluded, “I should 
doubt, whether any construction would be a just one, that leads to such in-
convenience or absurdity.”132 
Here, it would be an “absurdity” to require the commissioners to apply 
to the legislature for a clarification of their powers to take private property.  
By contrast, in several cases in which Kent interpreted private statutes grant-
ing privileges to individuals or corporations, he had required that the defend-
ants get legislative amendments before encroaching on private rights.133 
Having upheld the commissioners’ interpretation of the 1817 act, Kent 
still had to answer the part of the Supreme Court’s opinion in which it had 
ruled, reasonably, that the 1820 public road act was inapplicable to a privately 
owned turnpike and would be unconstitutional if it authorized the taking of 
Bradshaw’s land because it failed to provide for just compensation.  He an-
swered the first challenge with an extremely broad construction of the word 
“public” in the term “public roads.”  “I think,” he wrote, “the construction 
[the New York Supreme Court gave] is too limited for the object, and the 
subject matter of the provision.”134  He continued,  
A turnpike is a public road or highway, in the popular and ordinary 
sense of the words, and in that sense the legislature are to be pre-
sumed to have employed them.  Turnpike roads are, in point of fact, 
the most public roads or highways that are known to exist, and, in 
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point of law, they are made entirely for public use, and the com-
munity have a deep interest in their construction and preservation.  
They are under legislative regulations . . . .135 
This strained explanation did not answer another pesky problem—the 
requirement in the statute that the commissioners register the change in the 
public road with the local county office.  This would only be possible if “pub-
lic roads” were what the Supreme Court had said they were because privately 
owned turnpikes were not registered at county offices at all.  Kent dismissed 
this objection as “not . . . sufficient to control the construction.”136  After all, 
[t]here is no repugnancy in the law in applying that act even to a 
turnpike road.  It is, at least, a very harmless proceeding, and it 
may, on many occasions, be important to the public, that there 
should be this documentary evidence . . . of the change of the tract 
of the turnpike road.137 
The second objection—the lack of a compensation clause in the 1820 
act—should have been more difficult for Kent to dismiss, given his consistent 
approach to plaintiffs objecting to the incursions of corporations created by 
private bills.  In those cases, he expressed the emphatic belief that an “equi-
table and constitutional title to compensation . . . imposes it as an absolute 
duty upon the legislature to make provision for compensation, whenever they 
authorize an interference with private right.”138  But he had a creative solution 
to this problem in Rogers.  The 1817 canal act had authorized the commis-
sioners to assess the damage they created and pay compensation, and Kent 
simply read the 1817 act and the 1820 act together: 
All statutes, said Lord Mansfield, which are in pari materia, are to 
be taken together, as if they were one law; and, in many instances, 
a remedy provided by one statute, will be extended to cases arising 
on the same subject matter under a subsequent statute.  The act of 
1820 was only a specification of the course of duty of the commis-
sioners in a particular case; and it would have been quite unneces-
sary, and, in my humble opinion, quite idle, to have provided, that 
the general remedy for all damages occasioned by the exercise of 
any part of the whole mass of undefined power given by the act of 
1817, should apply to a portion of that power exerted in the partic-
ular manner provided for by the act of 1820.139 
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In a subsequent opinion, Kent was just as expansive in construing the 
canal acts.  In Jerome v. Ross,140 the canal commissioners broke up five thou-
sand loads of stone from a hillside on the plaintiff’s land, which lay at a dis-
tance of sixty rods from the path of the canal.141  The commissioners needed 
stone in order to complete a lock and dam on the Hudson River, which would 
open the Champlain Canal to sloop navigation.142  If the work were delayed, 
the commissioners said, a freshet in the river, which had been sunk to allow 
the work to go forward, would fill with water, and the canal would not be 
completed in the current season.  This would cause additional expense and 
redundant work for the contractors and would be detrimental to the public 
because the canal system couldn’t be used until the dam was completed.  Alt-
hough other land (and, the plaintiff claimed, other sources of stone) lay be-
tween the plaintiff’s land and the site of the canal, the commissioners asserted 
that they had the power to take the stone from his land under the provision in 
the 1817 canal act which said “that it shall . . . be lawful for the said canal 
commissioners . . . to enter upon, take possession of, and use all and singular 
any lands, waters, and streams, necessary for the prosecution of the improve-
ments intended by this act.”143 
The court below ruled for the plaintiff on the ground that the commis-
sioners did not “take possession of” the plaintiff’s land as authorized under 
the statute but merely entered it in order to harvest and take the rock away.144  
As a result, the commissioners would only pay for the damages to the land, 
rather than paying for the entire parcel of land as the compensation clause of 
the statute envisioned.  The court also reasoned that this use of the plaintiff’s 
land was not “necessary for the canal improvements [intended by the act]” 
but merely “more suitable and convenient than any other upon the same side 
of the river.”145  It pointed out, furthermore, that the plaintiff’s land was “sixty 
rods distant from the bank of the river, on the other side of a public highway, 
with severa[l] buildings and tiers of lots between them.”146  The judge wrote: 
 If the words of the statute warrant the taking of the stone under 
these circumstances, I can imagine no possible limit to the author-
ity or discretion of the commissioners. . . . I see nothing to prevent 
their taking from the lands and inclosures [sic] of individuals, any 
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other materials they may fancy, in any situation, or at any distance.  
Such a construction, therefore, is unreasonable and dangerous; and, 
if adopted, would give sanction to a stretch of power never con-
templated by the act.147 
Kent reversed, again confirming and extending the authority of the canal 
commissioners.  He recurred to the in pari materia argument he had used in 
Rogers, explaining that “these several canal acts constitute a distinct code of 
statute law, and are to be taken and construed together, as being made in fur-
therance of one great, useful, and splendid public object.”148  Kent pointed 
out that the 1816 statute authorized the commissioners to enter private lands 
temporarily for the purpose of surveying and leveling and that an 1820 statute 
authorized the commissioners to take rock from private lands in order to re-
pair the canals: 
The commissioners would then be authorized to take the stone 
from the ledge of rock in question to repair this dam in the Hudson; 
and can it be reasonably supposed, that the legislature did not in-
tend they should have this power for the necessary construction of 
the dam in the first instance?149 
He also dismissed the other objection—that the commissioners could 
only take permanent possession of private land, not borrow it—as nonsensi-
cal: “what possible objection can there be to the construction, allowing them 
to make as much use of the adjoining grounds as should be necessary for the 
prosecution of the improvements, and no more?”150 
To counter the lower court’s strongest argument—that the word “neces-
sary” in the statute could not allow the commissioners to travel a distance of 
sixty rods, across private plots and onto the other side of a public highway, 
eschewing other possible sources, to seize the plaintiff’s rocky ledge for use 
in the dam building project—Kent relied on the maxim that “[s]tatutes made 
for the public good, and for general and beneficent national purposes, are to 
receive a very liberal construction, and to be expounded in such a manner, as 
that they may, as far as possible, attain the end.”151  He wrote: 
The word “necessary” does not mean absolute and indispensable, 
or that without the use of the land, in the given case, the work could 
not possibly go on.  That would be the same as extreme necessity.  
The legislature used the word in a more reasonable and popular 
sense.  It is sufficient that the land used, and the materials taken 
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from it, are needful and conducive to the object, and more conven-
ient in the application, and less valuable, and the use of them less 
injurious to the owner, than any that might readily be selected.152 
Kent reiterated his holding in Bradshaw that the commissioners had a 
great deal of discretion under the canal acts.  And he voiced his approval for 
the commissioners’ decision, especially given that the plaintiff “[did] not 
state that the rock was of any use to him, as proper or fit for building, fencing, 
&c., or that it was even desirable as an object of ornament or taste.”153  In that 
sense, he concluded, the commissioners “did take care, as the act required, to 
do no unnecessary damage.  The materials must have been taken from some 
adjoining land; and from whence could they have been taken with more dis-
cretion?”154  Compare Kent’s use of the word “adjoining” here to his defini-
tion of the same word in Belknap. 
Viewed out of their historical context, Kent’s use of interpretive can-
ons—for example, his invocation of the principle that statutes in pari materia 
be read together—may seem like creative contortions.  But Kent wrote before 
the states and federal government kept neat statutory codes, properly indexed, 
and updated each year.  Today’s codes are constantly updated as legislatures 
pass new statutes amending the old.  When a lawyer wants to understand the 
meaning of a statutory provision, she begins by reading the entire codified 
act.  And she reads it with the presumption that it forms a coherent whole that 
does not contradict itself even though, chances are, the act is like Franken-
stein’s monster—an amalgam of provisions and amendments tacked on at 
different times.  In Kent’s day, legislatures simply passed new laws on the 
same subjects as existing acts, sometimes styling the new enactments as 
amendments but just as often not.  Every twenty years or so, the legislature 
had to hire someone like Kent to “revise” the acts—to collate laws that be-
longed together and make sure they didn’t contradict each other or other parts 
of the code.  As a judge, Kent retained his revisers’ sensibility, developed 
over his years working to forge New York’s statutes into a sound code.  A 
reviser’s role was to put statutes on the same topic together into one coherent 
larger statute and smooth away the contradictions that accumulated over 
time—exactly what Kent did when he interpreted public acts.  In other words, 
Kent’s decisions not only reflected his work as a reviser, they continued it.  
And by interpreting acts in ways that made them harmonious, Kent created a 
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body of law that New Yorkers could rely upon and in which their rights and 
duties were more predictable. 
More difficult to explain in terms acceptable to the modern lawyer is 
Kent’s use of expansive constructions—for example, his reading of the term 
“necessary” to mean “convenient.”  The fact is, Kent felt personally invested 
in the Erie project.  He made it possible with his crucial swing vote on the 
Council of Revision, and he came truly to believe that the success of the canal 
was important to New York’s economic wellbeing.  This may not seem like 
a judicial concern, but one must recall that he wrote these opinions while 
sitting on the Court of the Correction of Errors—a court that could not exist 
under a modern understanding of the requirements of “separation of powers.”  
He simply was not called on to play what we might think of today as a 
“purely” judicial role. 
Kent finished the substantive part of his opinion in Jerome declaring, 
“[w]e have advanced too far to recede.  The whole entire plan must and will 
be completed.”155 The rights of the commissioners, he said, must be sufficient 
to surmount “[a]ll little impediments” that stood in the way of the canal.156  
These words advert to a legal holding—the precise limits of an officer’s au-
thority under a statute—but hardly read like a legal text.  Kent continued that 
he “presume[d]” that he wrote with “the entire approbation of the senate,” in 
quoting himself from Rogers v. Bradshaw to say: 
[W]e must take expressions in the most extensive sense, when it is 
probable the lawgiver had in view every thing pointed out by that 
extensive sense . . . the sense most suitable to the subject, and best 
adapted to the facility and success of a great and generous scheme 
of public policy.157 
Kent had cause to presume that his opinion carried the Senate’s appro-
bation—not only because he had played a role in the legislative process but 
also because he wrote his opinion from a court made up almost entirely of 
senators. 
III.  AN AGE OF COLLABORATION 
Kent’s style when interpreting public acts was in part the result of his 
place in a unique constitutional structure.  But the practice of interpreting 
statutes equitably was a generational phenomenon.  Legal publishing in the 
first two decades of the nineteenth century was spotty, but we do have good 
records from some jurisdictions and especially good records from those 
judges who, with Kent, historians have remembered as the most influential 
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legal minds of his generation.  These records suggest that equitable interpre-
tation, and the attendant sense that judges were responsible for the legal co-
herence of statutory modifications to the common law, was a cultural and 
intellectual orientation that Kent had in common with a small class of excep-
tionally experienced and educated early American lawyers. 
Many of these men also had diverse careers in government that made 
them broad political as well as legal thinkers.  In this first post-revolutionary 
generation, perhaps because of the loss to the former colonies of lawyers who 
had sided with the British, there seemed to be a shortage of qualified men for 
important government positions.  This, in addition to the stratified class struc-
ture that persisted in many states, meant that a handful of men cycled through 
every important government post.  Those who ended their varied careers in 
the judiciary could not help but approach their cases with a broader and more 
comprehensive view of the needs of their “nations” (as they called the new 
states) and a sense of competence in multiple forms of government decision-
making. 
Equitable interpretation flourished in states with a strong bench and bar 
and where judicial power was not made a bone of contention in a struggle 
between different political factions.  These conditions held as we have seen 
in New York, but also in Massachusetts and South Carolina, where moderate 
Republicans and Federalists were able to cooperate on judicial appointments, 
the publication of opinions, and judicial reform measures in the early nine-
teenth century, even as curbing the power of the judiciary became a key issue 
for Jeffersonians on a national level.158 
Thus, South Carolina’s Chancellor Henry William De Saussure shared 
Kent’s perspective on the judge’s duty to make legal sense out of an awkward 
statute.  De Saussure was a Federalist who had served in multiple offices of 
government before he became a judge.  He started his public life as a soldier 
in the Revolutionary War, then served as the Mayor of Charleston, then be-
came a member of the legislature, where he was influential in the promotion 
of the bill to establish the University of South Carolina.159  In private life he 
ran a very successful law practice, in which he mentored John C. Calhoun as 
an apprentice, among other eminent South Carolinians.160  After ten years as 
a chancellor, De Saussure published a commentary on the case law of his 
court, hoping to codify his efforts toward a coherent law of equity.  In that 
commentary, he defined equity just as Justice Wilson had and as Kent would, 
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as “‘a judicial interpretation of the laws, which presupposing that the legisla-
tor intended what is just and right, pursues and effectuates such intention.’”161  
When he spoke generally of law and what “law” is, De Saussure described a 
shared legislative and judicial responsibility for creating the governing code 
of a nation.  “In a country where the citizens acknowledge no master but the 
laws,” he said, “it is becoming that they should be well informed what the 
laws are.”162  But where could citizens find the law?   
These are to be found, in the first place, in the statutes enacted by 
the legal representatives, duly elected.  But as no legislator, how-
ever learned or sagacious, ever did, or can provide by statute for 
the infinite variety of cases perpetually growing out of the complex 
and ever varying relations and transactions of men, a much greater 
body of law is formed by the decisions of courts of justice, pro-
nounced upon causes requiring some exposition or construction of 
the statutes when these are not sufficiently explicit, or founded on 
the great and immutable principles of justice, where the statutes are 
silent.163 
This was De Saussure’s vision as well as Kent’s: the judge was meant 
to cooperate with the legislature to make law, construing statutes with “eq-
uity”; reading in them only “right and just” intentions; fixing the statutes’ 
defects when necessary; adding in details and provisos as cases called for 
clarification of statutory rules; and maintaining as well the background norms 
of the common law where statutes were “silent.”  One sees his theory of in-
terpretation in action in cases like Croft v. Arthur.164  In Croft, he criticized 
the decision of an earlier South Carolina court, which had held that it “could 
not add words [to a statute] to give the law a different effect from that which 
it admitted on its face, nor to make that clear and perfect which was doubtful 
and imperfect—especially as penal laws are to be construed strictly.”165  In-
terpreting the same statute, De Saussure dismissed this precedent as unhelp-
ful: 
 With the highest deference for the authority of the learned judges 
who decided this case, I have not been able to satisfy my mind with 
this decision . . . .  Doubtless the act was very obscurely worded, 
but still I think the intention of the legislature was clear, and that 
intention was sufficiently though darkly expressed.166 
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He found that intention, not in the words of the act, which provided no 
guidance at all, but in the act’s purpose.  To follow precedent, he said, would 
be to agree that “the legislature meant to enact a nullity,” which De Saussure 
refused to do.167 
Massachusetts Chief Justice Isaac Parker, who would later help to found 
Harvard Law School, also displayed a Kent-like approach to statutory inter-
pretation in his dissent from the opinion of his court in Holbrook v. 
Holbrook.168  There, he showed that he believed himself responsible for both 
the legal soundness and also in some sense, the policy choices behind acts 
that he was called upon to construe.  Holbrook concerned a religious liberty 
statute that allowed a citizen to claim an exemption from tithing to his town’s 
parish if he paid his tithe to another church of which he was a member in-
stead.169  The question before the court was whether this exemption applied 
to a man who wanted to attend a church of the same denomination in a neigh-
boring town or whether its benefit was intended to extend only to those who 
worshiped at churches of a different denomination than that of their home 
church.170  The statute provided: 
[W]henever any person shall become a member of any religious 
society, corporate or unincorporate, within this commonwealth, 
such membership shall be certified by a committee of such society, 
chosen for this purpose, and filed with the clerk of the town where 
he dwells, such person shall for ever afterwards be exempted from 
taxation for the support of public worship and public teachers of 
religion in every other religious corporation whatsoever, so long as 
he shall continue such membership.171 
The plain text would seem to allow the plaintiff his choice of churches even 
if he decided to transfer his membership to another church of the same de-
nomination. 
But Chief Justice Parker refused to read the statute this way.  The whole 
point of the act, Parker insisted, was to protect religious dissidents, not town 
troublemakers.  He explained: 
[S]tatutes are not to be taken according to their very words, but 
their provisions may be extended beyond, or restrained within the 
words, according to the sense and meaning of the legislature ap-
parent from the whole of the statute, or from other statutes enacted 
before and after the one in question.172 
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He also argued that statutes should not be interpreted to conflict with 
“[t]he general system of legislation” on any given topic.173  These precepts 
expounded, he was inclined to rule against the plaintiff, a result that he in-
sisted was not based on his personal feelings.  In coming to this conclusion, 
he said, 
I think I have not been influenced by any apprehensions of the in-
jurious effect of a different determination, for I do not know 
whether it would be expedient, or inexpedient, to destroy what re-
mains of the obligations of citizens to contribute to the support of 
public worship by the corporations of which they are members.  
Perhaps so much has been done, that to do the rest will do no harm.  
At any rate, the legislature is to judge of this, and whenever it shall 
express its will in clear and unequivocal terms, I shall very readily 
submit.174 
It would be difficult to imagine, however, how the legislature could have 
expressed itself more clearly in the first instance.  Parker’s decision would 
seem to require legislative reiteration before its statutes could be taken as 
law. 
Some of the confident equitable interpretation opinions of this period 
emerged from jurisdictions in which judicial power was controversial.  In a 
dissent to an opinion reading a new law on inheritance in Virginia, Judge 
Spencer Roane also showed a tendency to consider the policy behind the law 
before giving effect to its provisions.  Roane came to the bench after serving 
in the Virginia Council of State and the Virginia Senate, and he would be 
chosen to revise Virginia’s laws twice over the course of his career.  In Tom-
linson v. Dillard,175 Judge Roane wrote that while he had been “[h]abituated 
to respect the Legislature of our country,” he nevertheless felt “no hesitation 
to say, that this law . . . was anti-republican and aristocratic; founded on false 
principles, and on a total dereliction of the policy of the [earlier] act.”176  The 
new statute governing descents was, he explained, “anti-republican and aris-
tocratic, because it tended to keep up the wealth of families; and so contra-
vene the wise policy which annihilated entails in 1776.”177  For this and other 
reasons, he voted to limit the effect of the change in the law by reading part 
of the statute as a mistake. 
Interestingly, North Carolina’s Thomas Ruffin, who was celebrated as 
a great judge in a state especially hostile to the judiciary, also gave statutes 
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atextual interpretations.178  Ruffin began his judicial career after having 
served for four years in the North Carolina House of Representatives, includ-
ing one term as its Speaker.  He is remembered for his position as Chief Judge 
of North Carolina’s Supreme Court in the 1830s, but brief stints as a superior 
court judge earlier in his career, from 1816 to 1818, and then again from 1825 
to 1828, established his reputation as a judge and a systemic thinker.179  Dur-
ing these years, his statutory interpretation cases showed greater concern for 
his own sense of the justice and the legal coherence of the outcome of a case 
than any precedential opinions construing the same statute or even the text of 
the statutes he construed.180  Ruffin believed that the role of the judge was to 
incorporate legislation into the general fabric of jurisprudence by interpreting 
it to cohere, rather than conflict, with preexisting legal structures.  In some 
statutory interpretation cases, Ruffin made no pretense of parsing the lan-
guage of the act itself, relying for his judgments on common sense informed 
by common law norms and values.181  In others, Ruffin bolstered his inter-
pretation by showing that, under the common law, the case would have turned 
out the same.182  His court also made use of the common law to supply defects 
in legislation even when this resulted in a broader interpretation and applica-
tion of criminal statutes.183 
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 181.  See, e.g., id.  Likewise, in Perry v. Perry, Ruffin was asked to decide whether the portion 
a widow had taken out of her husband’s estate was justified by the statute granting her dower.  4 
N.C. (Taylor) 617, 618 (1817).  He said simply that the allowance she had taken was “so palpably 
extravagant and bottomed on such a wrong construction of the law,—that it must be set aside and a 
new one made.”  Id.  Again, he cited no authority.  
 182.  See, e.g., State v. Wasden, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 596, 597 (1817) (concurring in the judgment 
and admitting that the case was controlled by a statute but also pointing out that the answer would 
be the same even without the statute); Hood v. Orr, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 584, 584 (1817) (“The act of 
Assembly is positive upon this subject; and since the case of Robertson v. Stone, 2 N.C., 402, the 
courts have always refused to relax the rule of law, without any regard to the causes of failure of 
the appellant.  Those decisions appear to me to be very proper, independent of the statute.”). 
 183.  See, e.g., State v. Walker, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 661, 662 (1817) (holding, in an opinion by Sea-
well, that even though the indictment for forgery under the forgery statute was insufficiently proven, 
no appeal would be taken because the defendant was still guilty of forgery as defined under the 
common law).  The interpretive canon that penal statutes are to be strictly construed was not thought 
applicable although it would most likely prevent a judgment like this today. 
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In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, the politicization of judicial power 
clearly had an impact on judges’ use of equitable interpretation.  Pennsylva-
nia’s court, which was the victim of several legislative experiments aimed at 
democratizing and de-professionalizing adjudication, shows a particularly in-
teresting duality in its statutory interpretation cases.  In cases concerning stat-
utes that modified or elaborated subjects that remained chiefly governed by 
the common law, Pennsylvania’s judges, and particularly Pennsylvania’s em-
inent judge John Bannister Gibson, used equitable construction as the norm 
whenever the statute seemed incomplete or contained an awkward phrase.184  
But in cases interpreting those statutes, like Pennsylvania’s mandatory arbi-
tration acts, which specifically constrained the court’s jurisdiction, the judges 
seemed to take a perverse enjoyment out of reading legislation strictly to the 
letter even when those textualist readings resulted in inconvenience and in-
justice.185 
Government and especially legislative experience also made an impact 
on how judges interpreted statutes, even though these other members of 
                                                          
 184.  See, e.g., Hersha v. Brenneman, 6 Serg. & Rawle 2, 4 (Pa. 1820). 
[I]f . . . rigidity of construction were to prevail, it would prevent grand-children from pe-
titioning the Court to award an inquest, and their right as to that, I believe, was never 
doubted.  Although not within the words, they are so entirely within the equity of the act, 
which intended to invest them with all the interest and privileges which their father could, 
if he had survived the intestate, have claimed, that we cannot hesitate. 
Id.; see also Waln v. Shearman, 8 Serg. & Rawle 357, 360 (Pa. 1822).  
These are strong expressions; so strong indeed, that I was at first induced to think it was 
impossible to get over them, even in cases where they produced extreme inconvenience; 
because, where the intention of the Legislature is clear, the Courts of justice are to carry 
it into effect, and are not responsible for consequences.  This is a principle not to be 
contradicted, but at the same time it must be acknowledged, that general expressions are 
sometimes to be modified where they are inconsistent with other parts of the same law, 
or of other laws on the same subject; or where they would produce a degree of injustice 
not to be attributed to the Legislature. 
Waln, 8 Serg. & Rawle at 360. 
 185.  See, e.g., Flanegan v. Negley, 3 Serg. & Rawle 498, 499 (Pa. 1817). 
The Court, however, are not ignorant of many inconveniences attending the arbitration 
system.  They have, on several occasions, pointed them out.  But it would be a breach of 
duty in them, to assume the right of amending the law.  They are bound to give an honest 
interpretation to the acts of the legislature, according to what appears to them to be their 
true meaning.  When inconveniences are felt, it is to be presumed, they will be remedied, 
by those to whom the constitution has entrusted the power.  In conformity to the con-
struction already established, I am of opinion, that the judgment in this case should be 
affirmed. 
Id.; id. (Duncan, J., concurring) (“The inconveniences arising from this construction, are many, and 
call loudly on the legislature for amendments and alterations.  But this consideration will not justify 
the Court in departing from the provisions of the act.”); see also Morrison v. Weaver, 4 Serg. & 
Rawle 190, 190–91 (Pa. 1818) (“An appeal . . . is certainly not expressly given [in one section of 
the arbitration statute]; and this Court cannot supply that which the legislature has totally omitted, 
even though we should suppose the omission arose from an oversight.”). 
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Kent’s generation did not hold their several government posts simultane-
ously, as Kent did.  As a result, a researcher must always read statutory in-
terpretation cases with an eye to the biography of the men who wrote them.  
For example, Nathaniel Chipman of Vermont, whose early career switched 
back and forth between legislative and judicial office, also served on Ver-
mont’s Council of Censors, an institution charged with reviewing legislation 
for constitutionality before it became law.  Knowing his career history, one 
reads Chipman differently when he subsequently interprets statutes in court.  
To understand his interpretation of ambiguous laws, one must check to see 
whether he had a prior chance to study and approve them as a censor or 
whether he was serving as a representative in the state assembly when those 
acts were passed.  In fact, he did participate in the assembly debate on an act 
that came before his court in an 1814 case.186  Therefore his decision in that 
case, citing the principle that “the Court ought anxiously to avoid any con-
struction of a law, which would imply in the legislature, either an ignorance 
of their powers and duties, or a design to violate the national constitution,”187 
cannot be read as a dry recital of a canon of construction.  He is relying on 
memory and, if memory fails, he is giving himself the benefit of the doubt. 
One judge whose experience clearly played a role in interpretive style 
was Zephaniah Swift of Connecticut.  When Swift wrote his first digest of 
Connecticut law, A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut, his public 
service had been confined to the legislative branches.  He had served in the 
state legislature for twelve sessions, including four terms as the clerk of the 
Connecticut Assembly and one term as Speaker, and he had also served for 
four years as one of Connecticut’s representatives to Congress.188  His 1795 
treatise included a list of canons of statutory construction, including the idea 
of construing statutes equitably.  But he warned that reading statutes atextu-
ally “gives too great latitude to judges, and may be improved to oppressive 
purposes.  It destroys that uniformity, certainty and precision, which are the 
essence of law.  It throws the rights of mankind afloat, by placing them upon 
the arbitrary opinions and capricious whims of judges.”189  If judges strayed 
too far from the text, “[t]he lawyer can never tell, how to advise his client, 
and the people cannot know the law.  This rule therefore should be admitted 
with great caution, and practiced upon with great prudence.”190  Admitting, 
                                                          
 186.  Starr v. Robinson, 1 D. Chip. 257 (Vt. 1814).  
 187.  Id. at 261; see generally DANIEL CHIPMAN, THE LIFE OF HON. NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, 
LL.D. (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1846). 
 188.  4 FRANKLIN BOWDITCH DEXTER, BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE GRADUATES OF 
YALE COLLEGE WITH ANNALS OF THE COLLEGE HISTORY: JULY, 1778–JUNE, 1792, at 60 (1907). 
 189.  1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 49 (Wind-
ham, John Byrne 1795). 
 190.  Id. 
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then, that interpreting statutes equitably was within the judicial toolkit, Swift 
expressed serious misgivings about its usefulness and propriety. 
After this first 1795 publication, in 1799 and again in 1801, Swift was 
elected to Connecticut’s “Council”—consisting of the governor, lieutenant 
governor, and twelve assistants.  Until 1806, this branch of government ex-
ercised veto power over all legislation and also convened as Connecticut’s 
highest court of appeal.191  Swift was then appointed a judge of Connecticut 
Superior Court, a position he held for eighteen years, the last five as chief 
justice.192  While on the court, he became increasingly frustrated with legis-
lative interventions into legal causes, and he even published an angry pam-
phlet denouncing the assembly for reversing one of his decisions.193  In short, 
he went from holding office as the assembly’s champion, to an office that 
made him its guardian, to one that forced him to be its critic.  The final public 
office of his career made him into the assembly’s editor: when the 1818 rati-
fication of Connecticut’s first written constitution removed Swift from his 
judgeship, Connecticut’s legislature commissioned him and two others to re-
vise its laws to conform to the new constitutional order.194  Swift performed 
the majority of this work and subsequently published his second digest and 
commentary on the laws of Connecticut.195 
Between the publication of this first digest and his second in 1822, 
Swift’s views had undergone a shift.  In the 1822 work, Swift defined law as 
the realization of “certain first principles existing in the nature and fitness of 
things” which “have been introduced by the statutes of the legislature, or have 
been derived from the dictates of reason,” as well as from policy considera-
tions.196  Swift’s later work discussed methods of statutory interpretation, in-
cluding an expanded list of canons of construction.  In the 1822 list, he de-
scribed equitable construction simply as “sometimes necessary.”197  He 
explained that judges must sometimes decide that “acts within the letter shall 
not be considered within the meaning, and acts not within the letter shall be 
                                                          
 191.  See id. at 63 (providing Swift’s view of this branch of government and its duties under “Of 
the Legislative Power”); id. at 93 (providing Swift’s view of this branch of government and its 
duties under “Of the Judicative Power”). 
 192.  DEXTER, supra note 188, at 61. 
 193.  ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, VINDICATION OF THE CALLING OF THE SPECIAL SUPERIOR COURT, AT 
MIDDLETOWN, ON THE 4TH TUESDAY OF AUGUST, 1815, FOR THE TRIAL OF PETER LUNG, 
CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF MURDER. WITH OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 
OF THE LEGISLATURE TO INTERFERE WITH THE JUDICIARY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
(1816). 
 194.  DEXTER, supra note 188, at 61. 
 195.  1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (New Ha-
ven, S. Converse 1822). 
 196.  Id. at 10. 
 197.  Id. at 11. 
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considered within the meaning.”198  The warning against judicial power, so 
prominent in the 1795 edition, had vanished.  Toward the end of Swift’s ca-
reer, Swift sometimes showed a willingness to expand statutes—even penal 
statutes—by importing common law norms in order to embrace behavior that 
their text did not reach. 199 
In sum, the states’ most influential judges tended, like Kent, to see them-
selves as responsible for the coherence, justice, and sometimes even the pol-
icy behind the statutes they were asked to construe.  They would add provi-
sos, expand coverage, or narrow the effects of statutes whenever they felt it 
was necessary.  These men made up the small group of judges who played an 
outsized role in the government of their states and whose works cast a long 
shadow over their state’s subsequent jurisprudence. 
Equitable interpretation seems startling to a modern observer, but early 
nineteenth-century interpretation must be viewed in its context.  That context 
includes not only rafts of unconstitutional statutes but also extremely poorly 
drafted ones.  In a Virginia case, for example, judges and lawyers made ref-
erence to the legislative history of a statute to argue over what text was meant 
to fill a blank line left in the statute book by the clerk of the assembly, where 
part of the text of the law should have been.200  In an opinion from Pennsyl-
vania, the question under discussion was whether a senseless parenthesis 
mark should have been placed in front of one word or another and which 
other words or marks might have to change in order to read anything rational 
in the badly transcribed text of the law.201  In a case from Connecticut, a judge 
faced a question of whether an amendment to a statute appearing after a gen-
eral revision of the laws was actually intended by the legislature or whether 
it was a revisers’ error.202 
One thing that judges practicing equitable construction had in common, 
therefore, was that they frequently had to deal with obvious and inescapable 
legislative mistakes and instances of carelessness.  With this understanding, 
the freedoms they took with legislative work of all kinds seem less strange.  
A second commonality among these judges was their legislative experience, 
which they probably believed equally useful when deciding whether a paren-
thesis was misplaced or whether the legislature really intended to change the 
                                                          
 198.  Id.  
 199.  See Fox v. Hills, 1 Conn. 295, 299–300 (1815) (expanding a fraudulent conveyance statute 
to prohibit conveyances that would tend to defeat the claims of a judgment creditor even though the 
statute only intended to protect the claims of a contract creditor). 
 200.  Tomlinson v. Dillard, 7 Va. (3 Call) 105, 118 (1801). 
 201.  Simpson v. Morris, 3 Yeates 104, 117–18 (Pa. 1800). 
 202.  White v. Wilcox, 1 Conn. 347, 349 n.(a) (1815) (“Whether the committee of revision in 
digesting the materials of the present statute, or the legislature in giving it their sanction, intended 
to vary the act of 1744 in substance, or only to adapt its phraseology to its new connexions [sic] 
must, at this day, rest upon conjecture.”). 
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law of descents.  In any case, so long as the task of interpretation constantly 
called upon the judge to revise entire sentences to give them rational or gram-
matical structure, it is not hard to see how a jurisprudence of equitable inter-
pretation might persist. 
One characteristic which did not unite these judges was their politics.  
Although Jeffersonian rhetoric of the early nineteenth century vilified med-
dlesome Federalist judges, the jurisprudential tendencies I describe were 
more clearly a matter of state constitutional structure, along with the states’ 
politics of judging and the individual judge’s experience, education, and per-
sonality.  Spencer Roane, who would have edited out troublesome amend-
ments to Jefferson’s statute abolishing primogeniture, was a leading Jeffer-
sonian Republican and one of the members of the “Essex Junto.”  He would 
later, under a penname, engage in an acrimonious pamphlet debate with John 
Marshall over states’ rights and Marshall’s Federalist jurisprudence.203  
Zephaniah Swift of Connecticut, who was much more hesitant to bend the 
language of a statute even when his feelings ran high, participated in the Fed-
eralists’ Hartford Convention.  Although it is tempting to parrot the trope of 
the high-handed Federalist bench, it is actually unhelpful to think of statutory 
interpretation philosophies in terms of political orientation.  But whether mo-
tivated by partisanship or not, and however the poor quality of legislative 
drafting may explain it, equitable construction afforded these judges enor-
mous political power. 
This is especially interesting because during the first few decades of the 
nineteenth century, that classic measure of judicial power—judicial review 
for constitutionality—was still only very rarely used.  Judges of this genera-
tion understood that a decision striking down a statute was fraught with dan-
ger to the institution of the court and should be hazarded only in extreme and 
unavoidable cases of legislative wrongdoing.204  What this history of equita-
ble statutory interpretation reveals, however, is that the pre-history of judicial 
review represented an opportunity for judicial creativity and strength.  Be-
cause courts could not easily set legislation aside, they instead took a greater 
role in molding statutes into acceptable forms.  Although only some judges 
saw this as their responsibility, these were scattered throughout the nation’s 
jurisdictions—those I’ve mentioned in New York, Massachusetts, Connecti-
cut, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and Vermont, 
along with Francois-Xavier Martin in Louisiana, whose work became a 
                                                          
 203.  See F. THORNTON MILLER, JURIES AND JUDGES VERSUS THE LAW: VIRGINIA’S 
PROVINCIAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, 1783–1828, at 87–90 (1994). 
 204.  When early nineteenth-century judges did strike down statutes, it was with an extremely 
apologetic tone.  See, e.g., Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 202 (1818). 
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model for codifiers,205 and Jeremiah Smith from New Hampshire, the home 
jurisdiction of Daniel Webster and other important lawyers.206 
Equitable interpretation was accepted by the leading thinkers (perhaps I 
should say the loudest, or most published, thinkers) on American law, but my 
sense is that many judges considered creative interpretations of statutes out 
of bounds.  One point of similarity between Kent and the other judges who 
practiced equitable interpretation was their extreme erudition.  Through ex-
tensive preparation for their role as judges, they had achieved a perspective 
from which they believed they could judge whether a statute transgressed a 
legal norm.  Not all early nineteenth-century judges were well-educated in 
the law, however, so many had no basis from which to oppose or correct the 
direction their legislatures had taken.  Also, whether as a result of their take 
on Jeffersonian Republican ideology or simply because of their jurispruden-
tial philosophy, many believed that state constitutions had made the legisla-
ture the ultimate authority on how law should develop, and their opinions 
reflected that perspective.207  In 1803, when a lawyer urged an enlarged, or 
“equitable,” construction of a public statute to a Kentucky court, the court 
responded that if its members, 
had been in the legislature when the law was on its passage, their 
humanity and justice might have induced them to have provided 
for those cases; but in their judicial capacity they are bound by set-
tled rules of construction, and it is their duty to declare what the 
law is and not what it should have been.208 
My sense is that more decisions like this one show up in the case law of 
this period than those claiming the right through “equity” to alter statutory 
language.  But the judges that practiced equitable interpretation also wrote 
the treatises on their states’ law.  Through law journals’ selective reporting 
of important decisions and other sources, these were the jurists who spread 
                                                          
 205.  See Michael Chiorazzi, Francois-Xavier Martin: Printer, Lawyer, Jurist, 80 L. LIB. J. 63 
(1988) (providing a pithy overview of Martin’s life and significance and a very helpful bibliography 
of works both by and about him). 
 206.  See JOHN PHILLIP REID, LEGITIMATING THE LAW: THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL 
COMPETENCY IN EARLY NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE 6–8 (2012) (identifying some of the great 
lawyers who originated from New Hampshire). 
 207.  See JOHN PHILLIP REID, LEGISLATING THE COURTS: JUDICIAL DEPENDENCE IN EARLY 
NATIONAL NEW HAMPSHIRE 4 (2009) (offering a broad perspective on judging, which “recounts 
the struggles in the early republic of two extremes . . . those who wanted a government of law de-
fined and administered by men educated in the common-law jurisprudence of England, making 
rulings and applying principles without regard for the politics of the day” and “at the other ex-
treme . . . people who mistrusted the law of professional lawyers and wanted all law to originate 
from republican institutions, whether law-applying jurors or law-creating legislators”); see also 
ELLIS, supra note 158, at 4. 
 208.  Nichols v. Wells, 2 Ky. (Sneed) 255, 259 (1803). 
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their influence to subsequent generations of lawyers in their own states and 
across state lines. 
Among these influential judges, James Kent was at an extreme, in his 
position in government, his ambition, and his philosophy of jurisprudence, 
but he was also the most influential of this group and the representative of 
this generation of great legal thinkers.  A populist majority definitively re-
jected both Kent and the institutions that had shaped him in New York’s Con-
stitutional Convention of 1821, when they abolished the Council of Revision, 
diluted the power of the Chancellor, and capped judicial careers at sixty years 
of age (Kent was then in his fifty-ninth year).  But Kent’s influence only 
grew, both through the opinions published in Johnson’s Reporter and through 
his great opus, Kent’s Commentaries.  If, for political, philosophical, or con-
stitutional reasons, many judges felt they could not use Kent’s expansive 
style of equitable construction or cite to English precedent alone when inter-
preting statutes, they could and did cite Kent as an authority on the construc-
tion of similar statutes in New York.  Through the Commentaries, Kent in-
fluenced the legislatures of other states as they passed laws, informed two 
generations of lawyers and judges as they interpreted statutes, and provided 
one of the basic texts for American legal education through the remainder of 
the nineteenth century. 
IV.  KENT’S COMMENTARIES AS AN EXTENSION OF HIS LEGISLATIVE 
WORK, AND THEIR INFLUENCE 
Kent’s Commentaries are a collection of his Columbia University lec-
tures on law.  Focused as they are on serving up what Lawrence Friedman 
called “the meat and potatoes of law,”209 the text can be dry in places.  It is 
more utilitarian than philosophical, aimed at the law student and practitioner.  
But to a reader familiar with Kent’s life, the Commentaries read as something 
of a memoir—the self-justifying memoir of the fallen statesman.  He lavishes 
attention on difficult questions that came before him in particular cases and 
on areas of law in which he revised New York’s statutes.  One sees echoes, 
too, of opinions he wrote during his tenure on the Council of Revision. 
Although not without its critics, Commentaries on American Law was, 
according to contemporary observers, the best-selling American law book 
yet.210  It became the basic text for legal education at Harvard, Yale, West 
Point, and the University of Nashville, among other places.211  And its suc-
cess brought Kent’s particular style of interpretation and his view on how 
                                                          
 209.  Lawrence M. Friedman, Heart Against Head: Perry Miller and the Legal Mind, 77 YALE 
L.J. 1244, 1251 (1968).  
 210.  HORTON, supra note 91, at 303–04. 
 211.  Id. at 302–03. 
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statutes and common law should interact to a wide and receptive audience of 
students and practitioners. 
One of the lectures in the Commentaries is dedicated to statutes and their 
interpretation.  The discussion begins with William Blackstone’s injunction 
that an act of the legislature is “the exercise of the highest authority that the 
kingdom acknowledges upon earth” and that an act “delivered in clear and 
intelligible terms, cannot be questioned, or its authority controlled, in any 
court of justice.”212  But Kent immediately qualified these statements, ex-
plaining that one of the ways courts respect the absolute authority of the leg-
islature is by interpreting their acts to fit with background law: 
When it is said . . . that a statute contrary to natural equity and rea-
son, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, is void, the cases 
are understood to mean that the courts are to give the statute a rea-
sonable construction.  They will not readily presume, out of respect 
and duty to the lawgiver, that any very unjust or absurd conse-
quence was within the contemplation of the law.213 
It is true, Kent acknowledged, that there are some statutes that simply 
have no ambiguities to exploit in this way, and “if it should happen to be too 
palpable in its direction to admit of but one construction, there is no doubt in 
the English law as to the binding efficacy of the statute.  The will of the leg-
islature is the supreme law of the land, and demands perfect obedience.”214  
But he qualified even this statement by adding that, though this supremacy 
exists in principle, “we cannot but admire the intrepidity and powerful sense 
of justice which led Lord Coke . . . to declare . . . that the common law doth 
control acts of Parliament, and adjudges them void, when against common 
right and reason.”215  After citing several examples of great jurists of the past 
who dared to uphold the integrity of the common law against the depredations 
of Parliament, he finally turned to the interpretation of American statutes, 
starting (of course) with the principle of judicial review.216 
Kent then turned to the nuts and bolts of interpretation, offering a list of 
interpretive canons, many of which would be familiar to the modern lawyer, 
and directing students on such diverse points as how much weight to give the 
titles of statutes, how provisos should operate, how to read technical words, 
narrowly construe penal statutes, and broadly construe remedial ones.  Apart 
from these textual guidelines, however, Kent stressed that “[t]he real inten-
tion [of the legislature] . . . will always prevail over the literal sense of 
                                                          
 212.  1 KENT, supra note 22, at 447. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. at 447–48. 
 215.  Id. at 448. 
 216.  Id. at 449–50. 
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terms.”217  And as his judicial opinions revealed, the search for the legisla-
ture’s “real intention” left room for quite a bit of judicial discretion: 
When the words are not explicit, the intention is to be collected 
from the context, from the occasion and necessity of the law, from 
the mischief felt, and the objects and the remedy in view; and the 
intention is to be taken or presumed, according to what is conso-
nant to reason and good discretion.  These rules, by which the sages 
of the law . . . have ever been guided in seeking for the intention of 
the legislature, are maxims of sound interpretation, which have 
been accumulated by the experience, and ratified by the approba-
tion of ages.218 
The statutory interpretation section of the Commentaries certainly re-
ceived its fair share of citations in judicial opinions of the nineteenth century, 
but the collection and dissemination of bare maxims of interpretation was 
only the least of the ways in which Kent influenced American judges’ inter-
pretation of statutes.  Kent also showed how courts could interpret statutes 
without running afoul of background legal norms by explaining the construc-
tion New York had placed on its own statutes, often referencing his own 
opinions.  For example, he illustrated the canon on remedial statutes with his 
opinion interpreting New York’s Mortgage Registry Act.219  In his lectures 
on the law of husband and wife, he described New York’s divorce statute in 
detail, and then he went on to discuss defenses to a divorce suit—defenses 
which were not in the statute but which were drawn from common law prec-
edent, such as lapse of time, cohabitation, and proof of the plaintiff’s adul-
tery.220  Similarly, he included common law elaborations and references to 
his own opinions in his discussion of New York’s extradition statute221 and 
its habeas statute,222 among many others. 
Judges from other states leaned heavily on Kent in their own statutory 
interpretation cases.  Sometimes, they looked to him as a source of canons of 
interpretation.223  But more often, judges cited Kent’s substantive interpreta-
tion of similar New York statutes.  In Prescott v. Carr,224 a New Hampshire 
case involving a dispute over a will, the presiding judge was confronted with 
issues that New Hampshire’s inheritance statute left ambiguous.  He cited 
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 219.  Id. at 465. 
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Kent’s Commentaries, and all of the sources that Kent included in that sec-
tion, for the principle that whole- and half-blood descendants inherit equally.  
And he ruled that real and personal property “goes alike to the same persons 
and in the same proportions.”225  In doing so, he relied on the English statute 
of distributions, explaining that this was an authority “which, says Chancellor 
Kent, being founded in justice, and in the wisdom of ages . . . has been well 
selected as the most suitable and judicious basis on which to establish our 
American law of descent.”226  The ruling required no other justification.  Hays 
v. Thomas,227 an 1826 Illinois opinion, used the Commentaries to resolve the 
same ambiguity as to whole- and half-blood inheritance under Illinois law.228 
Even when courts did not rely solely on the Commentaries, they used 
the Commentaries to lend weight to their opinions.  This was true even in 
decisions driven by the plain meaning of the statutory text, which would seem 
to require no support at all.  In Guion v. Burton,229 an 1838 Tennessee case, 
the dispute was over whether a parcel of uncultivated land could pass by de-
scent from a man who, under English law at least, had never actually been 
“seised” of the land; although he owned the land in question by a grant from 
the government, he had never set foot on the property himself.230  The Su-
preme Court of Tennessee cited Kent for the observation that the rule requir-
ing actual possession of the land was “founded in feudal reasons” and “can 
have very little force when applied to our modes of conveyance, and the cir-
cumstances of this country.”231  In the United States, most of the land re-
mained uncultivated; actual entry into lands given by grant was often “diffi-
cult, if not impossible” and actual possession by the purchaser of a plot of 
land could not easily be proved even if it had occurred.232  Furthermore, many 
parcels were owned by absentee English investors and other speculators.  The 
court concurred with Kent that “[t]o a country such as this, a strict adherence 
to the common-law doctrine of seisin would be exceedingly inconvenient, 
and destructive of rights which it is the office of the law to preserve.”233  Hav-
ing made these observations, the court looked at last to the text, which said 
in black and white that actual possession was not a requirement of Tennes-
see’s inheritance statute.  The court observed, however, that “[i]f this view of 
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the effect of our statute required support, it is to be found in the construction 
Chancellor Kent gives to the New York statute upon this subject.”234   
An 1851 Pennsylvania case concerned whether a woman could convey 
real estate that she owned separately from her husband.  Here, too, Kent sup-
plied the reasoning and supported the rule of decision.  “The weight of au-
thority, as Chancellor Kent remarks, would seem to be in favor of the exist-
ence of a general rule of law, that the husband must be a party to the 
conveyance.”235  The Supreme Court agreed with Kent: “[s]uch a rule is 
founded on sound principles arising from the relation of husband and wife . . . 
to avoid family discord and to protect her interests.”236  Although some states 
had made exceptions to this rule, the court said it was “happy to say Pennsyl-
vania is not one of them.”237  Only then did the court look to the text of the 
statute, which said, as plainly as possible, that both the husband and wife 
must execute a deed disposing of the wife’s property.238 
Even where judges looked to the decisions of other courts for support, 
it seems that they often relied on the Commentaries to find the relevant prec-
edent.  Their citations were therefore subject to Kent’s editing and pre-ap-
proval.  For example, in a dispute over which words were necessary to create 
a warranty under Alabama law that a parcel of land was being sold free of 
encumbrances, the Supreme Court of Alabama found a decision interpreting 
Pennsylvania’s identical statute helpful.  But the court did not cite Pennsyl-
vania’s reporter—it cited Kent.  The court noted that Kent believed the Penn-
sylvania case “furnish[ed] a correct exposition, not only of the Pennsylvania, 
but of our own statute also” and the court quoted Kent’s explanation of why 
Pennsylvania had gotten it right.239 
As the success of the Commentaries confirmed Kent’s stature as one of 
the nation’s foremost jurists, citations to his opinions recorded in New York’s 
Johnson’s Reporter also became more frequent.  In Ricks v. Doe ex rel. 
Wright,240 the Supreme Court of Indiana had to decide whether a deed later 
in time, though first recorded, would take legal precedence over a prior, un-
recorded deed of which the subsequent purchaser had actual notice.  The case 
turned on interpretation of Indiana’s 1818 registry act.241  The court decided 
                                                          
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Trimmer v. Heagy, 16 Pa. 484, 487 (1851). 
 236.  Id. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Roebuck v. Duprey, 2 Ala. 535, 541 (1841) (citing Lessee of Gratz v. Ewalt, 2 Binn. 95 
(Pa. 1809)). 
 240.  2 Blackf. 346 (Ind. 1830). 
 241.  Id. at 347. 
 2018] INTERPRETATION AS STATECRAFT 765 
 
that one of Kent’s decisions was “directly in point . . . as the act of [the] as-
sembly of New-York is the same as ours.”242  The court agreed with Kent that 
the statute, though silent on this issue, implied a requirement of good faith.243  
The Alabama Supreme Court similarly turned to one of Kent’s opinions for 
aid in the interpretation of a statute concerning promissory notes.  The court 
noted with gratitude that “Chancellor Kent, in his opinion . . . has imparted 
both light and order, to the dark and confused mass of adjudication upon this 
subject.”244  In a Pennsylvania case interpreting an inheritance statute, the 
court also turned to Johnson’s Reporter, noting that the question “has been 
deliberately examined in the Court of Errors in New York (where they have 
a similar statute).”245  The court relied, in part, on “Chancellor Kent, who has 
examined the case with great care, and whose views we adopt” for the con-
clusion that “a nuncupative will is not good, unless it be made by the testator, 
when he is in extremis.”246 
Even when courts chose not to rely on Kent, he remained present in their 
opinions because lawyers made heavy use of him in their arguments.  Be-
cause the Commentaries was both convenient and comprehensive, citations 
to it frequently dominated lawyers’ briefs.  As a result, judges often felt the 
need to explain themselves when their conclusions as to the meaning of their 
own states’ statutes differed from Kent’s interpretation of similar New York 
statutes.  In Wilson v. Clarke,247 for example, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania pointed out that New York had retained the fourth section of the British 
Statute of Frauds, which explained Chancellor Kent’s conclusion in a case 
with similar facts.  “But we are enabled to escape [his conclusion],” the court 
explained, “by the fact that this section has been omitted in the statute of 
Pennsylvania.”248   
In Tomlinson’s Lessee v. Devore,249 the question was whether a Mary-
land statute vested exclusive jurisdiction in chancery over the real estate of 
the mentally ill or whether chancery shared jurisdiction with courts of law.  
Chancellor Kent had interpreted New York’s statute on this subject to mean 
that chancery had exclusive jurisdiction, and his opinion rested on a particular 
provision of the New York statute.  The Maryland Court of Appeals felt it 
necessary to explain that the language of Maryland’s statute was slightly dif-
ferent.  “The negative expression in the Statute of New York, the Chancellor 
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construes to confer exclusive jurisdiction, and without this provision, the ir-
resistible inference is, that his jurisdiction would be concurrent with the 
courts of common law.”250  Only after distinguishing its case from Kent’s 
could the court move on to consider the actual text of the law and hold that 
Maryland’s act required a different outcome.251 
Whether they wished to or not, when nineteenth-century judges inter-
preted statutes, they had to contend with Kent—he was there in the courtroom 
with them, shaping the possible outcomes the case could take.  Kent’s Com-
mentaries, including his substantive teaching on how to interpret statutes in 
particular areas of law, became a reference work used in the courts of every 
state.  It was a text, moreover, with a bent in favor of judicial power to review, 
challenge, and mold legislation. 
Kent had always opposed codification of law, but when New York’s 
legislature made its first moves toward what would culminate in the Field 
Code of 1848, Kent greeted the news with equanimity.  His influence over 
the law, as a drafter of legislation, a defender of the Constitution, and an in-
terpreter of statutes, was quite secure.  Even under the most comprehensive 
code, he wrote, citizens would find, 
“that new and unthought of emergencies often happen that neces-
sarily require new supplements, abatements or explanations” and 
that “the body of laws that concern the common justice applicable 
to a great [commonwealth] is vast and comprehensive, consists of 
infinite particulars and must meet with various emergencies, and 
therefore requires much time and much experience as well as much 
wisdom and prudence successively to discover defects and incon-
veniences, and to supply apt supplements and remedies for 
them.”252 
Where this was true, there was room for what James Wilson had termed 
“equity”—for interpretation of the code, just as the earlier statute law had 
needed interpretation.  Kent could be justly confident that the judges of New 
York State would consult his writings first whenever these exigencies arose. 
The history of American statutory interpretation would be incomplete 
without a chapter on James Kent, even though the place he occupied in New 
York’s constitutional structure, poised between the judicial and legislative 
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branches, belongs to a lost world; even though his politics became obsolete 
during his lifetime; and even though his high-handed style, the product of his 
role in New York’s formative years, was necessarily distinctive.  The Com-
mentaries could not have emerged from any other source—they reveal the 
meticulousness of the compiler, the experience of the judge, and the vision 
and mind of the lifelong legislator.  With their constant notation on the proper 
interleaving of statutes and common law, the Commentaries became the basic 
educational and source text for American lawyers.  And Kent’s career, which 
began before the turn of the nineteenth century, would have an impact into 
the twentieth; Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. edited one of the final editions of 
the Commentaries before he took his place on the Supreme Court.253 
Kent’s period of statutory interpretation, though brief-lived, had a long-
term impact on the development of American law.  This is at least in part 
because the wariness toward legislatures and statutes that ran throughout 
Kent’s work and the work of his peers in other states did not become a fringe 
attitude.  Even as Kent’s elitist rhetorical phrasings became untenable, and 
even as the deference the legislature had showed toward him became a dim 
memory, his fundamental orientation toward legislatures remained main-
stream.  The political rhetoric of Jacksonianism, the first great American pop-
ulist political movement, maintained the theme that legislatures could be dan-
gerous and, above all, needed direction.  Jacksonians maintained a sharp 
distinction between “the people,” who would “remain . . . uncorrupted and 
incorruptible,” and their representatives, who could be “misle[]d and de-
ceive[d].”254  The executive veto was the first and the favorite Jacksonian 
solution to the problem of legislative overreaching, but when this did not 
prove sufficient to dam the flow of statutes, Jacksonians turned to what they 
saw as its corollary, the interpretation and invalidation of statutes by demo-
cratically elected judges.255  And those judges reached for Kent in part be-
cause it was easy—Kent provided accessible answers to judges less profes-
sionally prepared for their roles, and he was, as we have discussed, already a 
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fixture in the lawyers’ arguments—but also because his methods and doc-
trines about statutes suited the Jacksonian preoccupation with returning 
power from the legislatures back to the people.256 
V.  KENT AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY THEORIES OF INTERPRETATION: 
SOME OBSERVATIONS 
Kent’s approach to statutes had elements in common with twentieth-
century movements, particularly the teachings of the Legal Process School 
of the early twentieth century.  Like Hart and Sacks, he would have rejected 
the notion that law and society are separate.  He frequently eschewed tried-
and-true English precedents because they did not suit the American context, 
sometimes for purely practical reasons but just as often because they failed 
to capture the philosophical gains New York had paid for with the Revolu-
tion.  Kent’s statutory interpretation was also based in what Professors 
Eskridge and Frickey describe as “Organic Rationality.”257  That is, as a ra-
tionalist, he believed that legal questions could only be answered by reference 
to principles that fit into a systematic structure of law, one that was internally 
consistent and reasoned.  But like John Chipman Gray,258 Roscoe Pound,259 
and Benjamin Cardozo,260 Kent believed that the principles motivating legal 
commands evolved with society.  Indeed, the leading judges of his generation 
had to believe this; how else were they to make sense of legislative requests 
that they comb through the common law and accept only those aspects of it 
suited to the American context?261  And as Lon L. Fuller urged of twentieth-
century jurists,262 Kent believed that the soundness of the policy those prin-
ciples furthered was just as important as the systematic coherence of the out-
come of any particular case. 
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There were also, of course, striking differences between the way Kent 
interpreted statutes and the approach of the Legal Process School, differences 
that speak to the realities of judging during the decades just after the Revolu-
tion.  Legal Process scholars taught, for instance, that the resolution of com-
plex social problems should be left to agencies and legislatures, whose supe-
rior fact-finding abilities and capacity for planned regulation would lead to 
better, more consistent, and more democratically accountable outcomes.  But 
any concerns about the comparative competence of institutions of govern-
ment would have led the lawyers and jurists of Kent’s generation in the op-
posite direction.  As we have seen, Kent’s generation saw what legislatures 
did as piecemeal and ad hoc compared to the judicial lawmaking, which, at 
the time, more often took into account long-standing traditions and system-
atic concerns.  As such, the consensus of the Legal Process School that judges 
should acknowledge their role in the development of policy goals, but that 
they should do so as the junior partners to legislatures and agencies, would 
not have resonated with Kent or his peers.  That aspect of the Legal Process 
School depended on the existence of legislatures and agencies of high and 
growing institutional capacity.  Indeed, the practical difficulty of working 
with the legislatures of the early nineteenth century does much to justify the 
intuition of Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule that the method of statutory 
interpretation should be chosen based on the relative institutional capacities 
of the relevant players.263 
The most striking difference between Kent’s generation and jurists of 
the twentieth century, however, was that Kent’s consideration of the policies 
underlying his decisions and inherent in the legal principles he announced 
was neither subconscious, nor clandestine, nor something that he needed a 
“theory” to justify.  He frankly avowed his policy rationales on the face of 
his opinions.  His jurisprudence is, in this sense, offensive to the wide swath 
of twentieth-century legal theories, which have in common their genesis in 
the progressive critique of Lochner v. New York264 and the related labor cases.  
The motivating concern of twentieth-century legal scholars has been either 
how to limit the policymaking function of the judiciary through textualism 
and other muzzling doctrines, or how to bring that policymaking out of the 
shadows and channel it in ways that pose less of a challenge to democracy.  
But this concern over “activist judging” that has motivated post-Lochner 
judges and theorists, and to some extent still characterizes the constitutional 
law curriculum, is a problem that grows out of that strict separation of powers 
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that we see as central to republicanism.  Kent’s view of “separate powers” 
was something that we would not recognize as such.  The lines we are used 
to, the lines we now depend upon and police as central to the structure of 
American constitutionalism, were for the following generation to define. 
When Holmes wrote, in The Path of the Law, that “[b]ehind the logical 
form” of statutory interpretation decisions “lies a judgment as to the relative 
worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate 
and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the 
whole proceeding,”265 he threw aside a veil that had been drawn over the ju-
dicial process for almost a century.  Kent’s generation of jurists operated be-
fore the veil.  This Article should not conclude, however, without some notes 
on why the following generation found it necessary to disavow policymak-
ing, and how they did so. 
During the Jacksonian era, the American judiciary was forced to rede-
fine itself, now as an integral part of a democratic republican government.  
The surge of populism that carried Jackson into the presidency in 1828 sig-
naled the rise of a political party obsessed with democratic legitimacy in gov-
ernment office and deeply suspicious of delegated authority.  These trends, 
combined with Democrats’ disdain for erudition and their repudiation of the 
condescension of an earlier generation’s “natural aristocracy,”266 forced 
judges interpreting statutes to find new ways to justify their role in the law-
making process.  At the same time, the great legal controversies of Jackson’s 
presidency and the lead-up to the Civil War were more delicate and more 
political than ever before.  The questions raised in statutory interpretation 
cases were existential; they asked courts to decide—to name just two—
whether and to what extent a human subject to the laws was a “person” under 
the laws and whether and how much governmental authority could be given 
away to private corporations. 
So what tools did the judiciary develop to deal with statutes produced 
by majoritarian legislatures—statutes that were increasingly dangerous to 
construe?  Courts managed the problem in two ways.  First, they recast legal 
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questions as questions of institutional power.  At the federal level, the judici-
ary was more a victim of this process than its protagonist.  Chief Justice 
Roger Taney’s Supreme Court created doctrines that minimized its power in 
order to avoid entanglement in the biggest problems of state, an effort that 
succeeded until Dred Scott v. Sandford.267  But at the state level, the “Judicial 
‘Can’t,’” as Robert Cover called it,268 became not only a mantra but even a 
badge of pride. 
The second, related way, was by speaking and thinking of jurisprudence 
as a science—rather than as a form of governance, which highlights the au-
thority of the judge to make political decisions, or an art, which draws atten-
tion to the judge as a personality.269  This was the veil drawn to obscure the 
policymaking power of the judiciary, and it involved both a new way of talk-
ing about the legal process and a new definition of the judge’s turf.  In order 
to assert that statutory construction was a science requiring specialized ex-
pertise, judges had to take the work of interpreting law away from other in-
stitutions, including juries and even legislatures.  In the process, equitable 
interpretation, and judges’ other more collaborative means of directing stat-
utory innovations, fell away, and judicial review for constitutionality took 
their place.270  Judicial review, while more rigid and more authoritarian, was 
more acceptable to the new political culture because it represented a claim to 
a specialized expertise that legislatures did not share.  These moves preserved 
a sphere for judicial action that was not poisonous to Jacksonian political 
tendencies.  Legal “science” does not compete with popular sovereignty, be-
cause it posits a law that is rather than a law that does. 
The reinvention of judicial authority complemented changes to the leg-
islative branches of the states.  In the 1840s and 1850s, some state constitu-
tions were amended to prohibit private, special, and local legislation.271  The 
resulting increase in general legislation shifted the administration of whole 
swathes of social and economic relations to the courts.  Divorces, incorpora-
tions, and other legal transactions previously handled case-by-case by the 
legislatures were now governed by generally applicable statutes, interpreted 
to fit the facts of specific cases by courts.  Yet, while delegates to these con-
stitutional conventions spoke of curtailing the discretion of the legislatures, 
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they expressed remarkably little concern over the transfer of that discretion 
to the courts.  Rather, in testament to the success of the new view of law as 
science, the debates show that delegates imagined that they were eliminating 
certain types of discretion from government altogether.272  And the change in 
legislation gave judges more raw material on which to apply their “scientific” 
methods.  As statutes focused more on general principles, judges shifted from 
the mechanical application of private bills to individuals to the more “law-
like” distillation of rules in particular cases.  Although a complete shift to 
general legislation did not occur until well after the Civil War, general gov-
erning statutes were increasingly common and became the rule in at least 
some states. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Kent was the most influential of an important generation of American 
judges whose impact helps explain the development of American law and 
legislation in subsequent years.  If Willard Hurst’s claim is right, that later 
nineteenth-century judges were able “to take for granted the law’s frame-
work-setting function to an extent that did not do justice to its actual im-
portance,”273 it is only because that frame had already been built before their 
time.  American law did not fall apart in the nineteenth century—rather, com-
mon law legal doctrines were elaborated, explained, and reinforced, building 
over time to a more national, rather than state-by-state, American system of 
law.  Kent’s overview of American law, his influence, along with other mem-
bers of his generation, on judicial interpretation, and the rise of legal profes-
sionalism in the United States more generally, provided both structure for the 
legislatures who consulted the texts and precedents and safeguards for those 
that did not.  The new American treatise writers, including Justice Story, were 
part of this evolution, but Kent and other early writers like Swift and De 
Saussure were the vanguard.  As the next generation of American jurists 
turned toward a more “scientific” approach to interpretation, those later ju-
rists found the basic principles of law and discovered the eternal themes of 
the law in the materials that Kent’s generation had provided. 
Understanding how this first generation of nineteenth-century jurists 
bridged what we think of as judicial and legislative roles, one begins to see 
how the first century of Americans overcame the central problem of legisla-
tion—the problem that arises when non-experts write laws that must interact 
with the constitutional rights and common law norms that citizens depend 
upon.  These great legal minds contributed to a new level of substantive con-
sistency in drafting and interpretation, which would be necessary before 
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American legislatures could move beyond piecemeal and private legislation 
and toward larger public projects and regulatory acts.  Only after this contri-
bution did judges begin to assert lines of demarcation between judicial work 
and the legislative prerogative, effectively obscuring the judiciary’s original 
role in supplying the substantive norms through which statutes are inter-
preted. 
